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Abstract
Group Selection and Key Management Strategies for Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption
Russell F. Martin
Supervising Professors: Dr. Marcin Lukowiak and Dr. Stanisław Radziszowski
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE) was introduced by Bethencourt,
Sahai, and Waters, as an improvement of Identity Based Encryption, allowing fine grained
control of access to encrypted files by restricting access to only users whose attributes
match that of the monotonic access tree of the encrypted file. Through these modifications,
encrypted files can be placed securely on an unsecure server, without fear of malicious
users being able to access the files, while allowing each user to have a unique key, reducing
the vulnerabilites associated with sharing a key between multiple users.
However, due to the fact that CPABE was designed for the purpose of not using trusted
servers, key management strategies such as efficient renewal and immediate key revocation
are inherently prevented. In turn, this reduces security of the entire scheme, as a user could
maliciously keep a key after having an attribute changed or revoked, using the old key
to decrypt files that they should not have access to with their new key. Additionally, the
original CPABE implementation provided does not discuss the selection of the underlying
bilinear pairing which is used as the cryptographic primitive for the scheme.
This thesis explores different possibilites for improvement to CPABE, in both the choice
of bilinear group used, as well as support for key management that does not rely on proxy
servers while minimizing the communication overhead. Through this work, it was found
that nonsupersingular elliptic curves can be used for CPABE, and Barreto-Naehrig curves
allowed the fastest encryption and key generation in CHARM, but were the slowest curves
for decryption due to the large size of the output group. Key management was performed
by using a key-insulation method, which provided helper keys which allow keys to be
transformed over different time periods, with revocation and renewal through key update.
Unfortunately, this does not allow immediate revocation, and revoked keys are still valid
until the end of the time period during which they are revoked. Discussion of other key
management methods is presented to show that immediate key revocation is difficult without using trusted servers to control access.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
While current private key cryptosystems, such as AES, are believed to be mathematically
secure, they are only as secure as their keys are. Any user with the encryption key is
able to decrypt and subsequently access the data. This proves difficult when needing to
authorize a large group of individuals to decrypt the data, as any of the users has a chance
to maliciously or accidentally distribute the key to unauthorized individuals, allowing them
access to decrypted files they shouldn’t normally have. One option in cryptography that
allows each user to have a unique key is Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CPABE), introduced by Bethencourt, Sahai, and Waters in 2007 [4]. In such a scheme,
users have a private key associated only to their identity, with control to various ciphertexts
given by a list of attributes they possess. CPABE was not the first cryptosystem satisfying
this criteria, with its roots based in Identity Based Encryption (IBE), originally proposed
by Shamir in 1984 [31].
Shamir’s original IBE scheme was designed to allow encryption and signature verification between two users without any exchange of keys, instead using a trusted server to
generate unique keys for each user. Instead of directly having users handle keys, personal
information unique to a user, such as address, social security number, name, or a combination of such, were used as the public key. When joining the network, the user would
be issued a personal smartcard that contains their private key. With this card, the user can
encrypt, decrypt, or sign messages to any other user. To prevent unauthorized access or duplication of a card, the users would be required to enter a personal password to access the
private key. The main advantage to this system over other public key infrastructure (PKI)
implementations is that subsequent communications did not require any access to such infrastructure. This allows users to be added to the network without having to update any
keys or infrastructure such as a user list, nor require it of the individual users. Additionally,
there was no restriction that the users must be online or connected to the network in order to verify some of these properties when other users needed them. Shamir designed this
scheme to be used for large companies such as banks, and the scheme was very expandable,
supporting multiple key distribution centers and millions of users.
This IBE scheme used modular exponentiation to validate signatures and generate private keys for the users. A signature (s, t) for the message m, signed by the user i was
verified by the equation
se = i · tf (t,m)
where n is the product of two large primes, similar to RSA, e is another large prime that is

2

relatively prime to φ(n), and f is a secure one-way function. The security in this scheme is
associated with the factorization of n, as users can know n, but if they know the factorization then they can use it to generate other valid keys. The value i from the above equation is
a integer representation of the user’s identity, which is equal to g e mod n, with g being the
user’s secret key. Shamir did not discuss a structure for encryption and decryption within
the scope of that paper, leaving it an open problem.
Sahai and Waters improved on IBE [29], by transforming a user’s identity from a single
string into a set of attributes, as well as adding an error tolerance, allowing a user to decrypt
an encrypted file if their attributes were within a small difference. These errors could
not be accounted for in the original IBE scheme, as identities were restricted to an exact
string of characters. However, by allowing an error range for attributes, not only were
biometric identities like an eye scan allowed, but attribute based encryption (ABE) was
created. One of the most important changes made in this scheme is the fact that each
attribute was directly linked to the rest of the user’s attributes, instead of simply having an
independent key for every attribute. With independent keys per attribute, multiple users
could collude and use their keys to together decrypt a file that no single user could decrypt
on their own. When using fuzzy metrics such as biometrics, this scheme would be used
by mapping unique features from the image to attributes and matching based on those
attributes.
In order to decrypt files within this ABE scheme, a file would be encrypted with an access policy associated with the identity of the user encrypting the file, and a threshold value
d. Users wishing to decrypt the file could only do so if their own private keys contained at
least d of the same attributes as that of the access policy. This scheme used bilinear maps to
match values of the ciphertext and secret key, as well as polynomial interpolation between
the attributes, much of the same way that CPABE does.
One of the largest restrictions to this scheme is the fact that the access policies are
restricted only to a threshold of attributes, or a“d out of k” scheme. This means that no
other control can be done outside of listing attributes, making it difficult to have fine control
of the access to the decrypted file, with the attributes given to users controlled by the key
generation center and not the users encrypting the files.
Goyal et al. [15] provided a more expressive modification to ABE, called Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (KPABE) which modified the original ABE scheme to allow
the user’s private key to contain the access structure of multiple levels of properties, while
the encrypted texts contain a set of attributes or flags that are used to check if the key’s
access tree is satisfied. For example, if Alice’s key in KPABE contains “X AND Y” as the
access policy, the only files she can decrypt are those that have both attributes X and Y. A
ciphertext with only attribute X could not be decrypted by Alice, as the access tree would
not be satisfied. Multiple levels of access control are supported, with any monotonic access
tree able to represent the attributes of the files a user is able to decrypt. An example of this
access tree is shown in Figure 1.1.
Similar to that of the original ABE scheme, the keys given to users are also collusion
resistant, meaning that two users could not use an overlap of attributes within their keys in
order to decrypt files neither would be able to decrypt on their own. This is done through
levels of secret sharing over the access tree, with values associated with each attribute in the
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Figure 1.1: Example Access Tree for KPABE and CPABE

key, just like the ABE and CPABE designs. The other details of KPABE are not discussed
in depth here, as they are very similar to that of CPABE, but with a reversal of the key and
ciphertext values used for decryption.
The main issue with KPABE is the fact that the control of the access to the encrypted
data is only controlled by the attributes given to the file, and not a controlled access tree [4].
A user encrypting a text in a KPABE scheme has no control over sets of attributes given to
the users, and this makes fine control of access requiring multiple properties challenging.
This is one of the reasons that led to the design of CPABE, as CPABE allows the desired
attributes to be set by the user encrypting data with fine-grained control, while the key
generation consists of issuing properties which cannot be directly connected to a specific
ciphertext. An additional restriction of KPABE is the fact that all attributes must be made
public, as they are each a component of the public key.

1.1

Thesis Organization

The first several chapters in this thesis provide the neccessary background for the work
provided. Readers who are familiar with CPABE, bilinear groups, and elliptic curves may
skip these chapters.
CPABE is introduced in Chapter 2, and the mathematical functions and derivations of
all of the operations in the scheme are provided. An example is then provided to show an
example implementation of CPABE. Additionally, a brief discussion of the limitations of
CPABE is presented, to show motivation for the work of the thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces bilinear groups, the underlying crytographic primitive that is used
for CPABE and other IBE cryptosystems. The properties of these are explained, and then
the desired properties of these groups are shown, and why they are needed in the context
of CPABE. This chapter will then cover the new security definitions that are made possible
by defining this mapping.
Elliptic curves are then covered as the main topic of Chapter 4. In this chapter, a brief
introduction to elliptic curves, point finding, and point counting over the curves is provided.
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The rest of this chapter is used to show how a bilinear pairing can be performed over elliptic
curves, and an example is provided.
Chapter 5 expands on the previous chapter with the various types and groups of elliptic
curves that can be used to provide a bilinear pairing, mostly contained from the curve
types supported by Lynn in the Pairing Based Cryptography Library [23]. Additional brief
coverage is provided regarding pairings over non-elliptic curve fields, as well as supporting
work for using different pairings for Attribute-Based Encryption. Following that, the first
section of new work is presented, regarding the possibility of using asymmetric curves for
CPABE, and the performance of such curve types compared to the original implementation.
The next chapter, Chapter 6 provides an introduction to key management techniques
required by many cryptosystems. It is then shown how CPABE inherently prevents some
of these techniques from being adequately performed. The chapter then discusses previous
works, including why these techniques are or are not restrictive in the implementation of
CPABE. The new work is then provided, with motivation and changes, as well as a short
theoretical performance analysis.
Finally, this thesis closes out with Chapter 7, a summary chapter discussing both the
work performed through the previous chapters, as well as future work and directions in
order to improve and expand upon the work of this thesis.

1.2

Contributions

The original contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. A detailed proof showing that asymmetric bilinear pairings are suitable for use in a
Ciphertext- Policy Attribute-Based Encryption setting.
2. Performance comparison of five curve types of equivalent security provided by the
Pairing Based Cryptography library [23] for CPABE functions.
3. Proposal of a Key Insulated CPABE scheme that supports non-immediate revocation
and low overhead renewal through temporal keys.
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Chapter 2
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
CPABE, first defined by Bethencourt, Sahai, and Waters [4], consists of five functions.
These functions are Setup (Section 2.2), Key Generation (Section 2.3), Encryption (Section
2.4), Decryption (Section 2.5), and Delegation (Section 2.6). Access to encrypted files is
controlled by any monotonic access tree, covered in Section 2.1. Later in this chapter, a
detailed example of usage of CPABE is presented in Section 2.8, and is followed up by the
inherent limitations of CPABE in Section 2.9.

2.1

Access Trees

The attributes required to decrypt a file within the CPABE scheme are described at the file
level through a monotonic access tree τ . τ is represented by a series of nodes in the tree,
each representing either an attribute or a boolean/threshold gate. The topmost node within
the tree is the root node, denoted by R, and x in the remainder of this section represents
some other node. For every non-leaf node in the tree, it has an associated threshold value,
kx , which can range from 1 to the total number of child nodes of that node, denoted by
numx . For a boolean AND gate, this can represent any number of inputs by setting kx =
numx . For a boolean OR gate, this is simply kx = 1. Additionally, the threshold is not
restricted to only these two values, and can be any value in between, which allows such
nodes to be satisfied when “2 out of 3” children are satisfied, for example, by setting the
value kx = 2 and having 3 total leaf nodes for that node.
With the model of the access tree defined, one can then subsequently define functions
on the nodes. A unique integer indentifer is also given to each node in the tree, and this is
obtained from the result of the function index(x). Parent(x) is defined for all nodes in the
tree except R, and this function returns the index the parent of the node in the tree. Finally,
leaf nodes also have attr(x), which returns the value of the attribute that is associated with
the tree. The final function, performed only when analyzing the tree after being given a set
of attributes to test for satisfaction, is denoted by τx , returning a value of 1 if the node is
satisfied, and either 0 or a blocking value (⊥) if it is not satisfied. This evaluation is done
recursively on the tree, starting with the root node. Let γ be the set of attributes the user
attempting to decrypt the file posseses. For a leaf node x, τx = 1 if and only if attr(x) ∈ γ.
For a non-leaf node, τx = 1 if and only if kx child nodes return 1.
The aformentioned structure works well for representing attributes that are of string
type, but needs to be adapted slightly to work with numerical attributes. CPABE uses a
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OR
a : 0***
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a : *0**

OR
a : **0*

a : ***0

Figure 2.1: Bag of bits representation of a < 11

“bag of bits” structure to represent numerical attributes, represented by n child nodes over
multiple levels, where n is the number of bits desired in the numerical representation of the
attribute. Figure 2.1, originally shown in [4], shows the gate structure that would be used
in the case of implementing “a < 11” in a four bit representation. In this tree, the attribute
is split up and analyzed based on boolean operations on each of the bits. For example, the
top level will be satisfied if the most significant bit is 0, as this means the value must be
less than 8. If that is not satisfied, then it checks that the other bits are not set to the point
where a would be greater than or equal to 11.
One point of note is that in the implementation of CPABE provided by [4], the way
these numerical values are defined in these access trees prevent matching with access trees
of the same attribute but over a different number of bits. In this case, the access tree shown
would not match an access tree implementing “a < 11” over five bits.
Definition 2.1 An access tree τ is monotonic when for all sets of attributes S that satisfy
τ , any superset of S, S̃ will also satisfy τ .
In CPABE, a goal is set of being able to realize any monotonic access tree into the
access tree restricting access to an encrypted file. A limitation of CPABE is this inability
to handle nonmonotonic access trees (See Section 2.9).

2.2

Setup

Prior to any key generation or encryption, CPABE must be initialized to the desired underlying bilinear group, which is used as part of the private key, P K. This is performed
within the machine that generates the keys for all users, as this setup step also generates
a master key, M K, which is used for key generation. With this master key, one is able to
generate specific user keys. This key must remain secure or else malicious users can use it
to generate any keys they desire.
The setup process begins with the selection of a bilinear group G0 of prime order p,
with generator g. Details of the choice of this bilinear group is covered in depth in Chapter
5. The next step is to randomly select two elements, α and β ∈ Zp . With these steps
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completed, the setup is complete, and
P K = G0 , g, h = g β , f = g 1/β , e(g, g)α
M K = (β, g α )
where e(g, g) is a bilinear pairing, e : G0 × G0 → G1 , and G1 is a multiplicative cyclic
group, also of order p (See Chapter 3) [4].

2.3

Key Generation

Key generation for a user requires two parameters, the master key of the CPABE scheme, as
well as S, the set of attributes that the user possesses. This algorithm begins with randomly
choosing a value r ∈ Zp , as well as random values rj ∈ Zp for every attribute j ∈ S. The
value of r is chosen as a way of binding the value associated with the attributes to a value
which is unique to the user who the key is valid for, preventing collusion between users.
The output of this algorithm is a secret key associated with a user, SK,
SK = (D = g (α+r)/β , ∀j ∈ S : Dj = g r · H(j)rj , Dj0 = g rj )
where H(j) is a secure hash function which maps any binary string representation of an
attribute to an element of G0 .

2.4

Encryption

Encryption of a file or message, M , is performed with the public key generated during the
setup step, as well as τ , a monotonic access tree which represents the attributes needed for
decryption of the message. In the scope of this thesis, it is assumed that all messages are
represented as an element of the output group of the bilinear map, G1 . Details of how a
message can be translated to an element are not covered in detail, but Lynn does provide
some discussion of hashing values to elements of the bilinear maps in [22].
The encryption begins with the generation of the polynomial qx for every node x within
τ . The degree of each of these polynomials, dx , is set equal to the threshold value of the
node, kx , minus one. Starting with the polynomial of the root node R of τ , qR , qR (0)
is set equal to s, where s is a randomly chosen value of Zp . All other coefficients of
the polynomial are set to random values from Zp . The values for all nodes are randomly
generated per user to prevent collusion attacks, as a satisfying attribute from one key will
not produce the same value for another user’s polynomial. Note that the encrypting users
are not required to have the desired attributes as part of their private key, meaning that it
is possible that a user could encrypt a file that they would not be able to decrypt with their
CPABE key. Additionally, because CPABE is a large universe scheme, with any arbitrary
string being used to match an attribute, users may even use attributes that have never been
used in the scheme before when specifying their access policy.
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For any other node x in τ , the polynomial qx is defined by qx (0) = qparent(x) (index(x)),
while the other dx coefficents are again set to dx random values of Zp . Following completion of the polynomial generation, the encryption and performed and the ciphertext is
CT = (τ, C̃ = M · e(g, g)αs , C = hs ,
∀ y ∈ Y : Cy = g qy (0) , Cy0 = H(attr(y))qy (0) ),
where Y is the set of all leaf nodes in τ .
In the above listing of the encryption, τ is listed as part of the ciphertext output. This is
debatable and depends on the restrictions of the application. In some cases, by having this
value public, users are able to discern some details of the plaintext, such as which group
this file is being communicated within. There is no strict need that τ must be public, and it
can be a hidden value if needed. All this means is that users will not know if they are able
to decrypt the file until they attempt decryption.

2.5

Decryption

Decryption occurs when a user with personal key SK wishes to decrypt the ciphertext
represented by CT . Decryption is a two step process, with the first decrypting the nodes
to determine if the ciphertext’s access tree τ is satisfied by the user’s properties within
SK, and the second performing the decryption of the message itself. For the first step, the
DecryptNode function is called recursively, starting with the root node R of τ . Let Fz be
the value returned by the recursive call to the child node z.
If z is a leaf node, let i = attr(z). If i ∈ S, then
e(Di , Cx )
e(g r · H(i)ri , g qz (0) )
=
e(Di0 , Cx0 )
e(g ri , H(i)qz (0) )
e(g r , g qz (0) ) · e(H(i)ri , g qz (0) )
=
e(g ri , H(i)qz (0) )
e(g r , g qz (0) ) · e(H(i), g)ri qz (0)
=
e(g, H(i))ri qz (0)
= e(g r , g qz (0) )

DecryptN ode(CT, SK, z) =

= e(g, g)r·qz (0) .
However, if the attribute i ∈
/ S, then DecryptNode returns a blocking error value, denoted
by ⊥.
On a non-leaf node, DecryptNode first collects the results from all of its child nodes.
It then chooses a random subset of kx child nodes of z, where Fx 6= ⊥ for each chosen
node. If there are not kx child nodes satisfying this criteria, then Fz returns ⊥. If there is
such a set Sx of these child nodes, a polynomial interpolation is performed on the nodes,
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by letting ∆i,S (x) =

Q

x−j
j∈S,j6=i i−j ,

0
Sm

and then computing
i = index(x),
= {index(x) : x ∈ Sx },
Y ∆i,S0 (0)
Fz =
Fx x
x∈Sx

Y

=

e(g, g)r·qx (0)

∆i,S0 (0)
x

x∈Sx

=

Y

e(g, g)r·qparent(x) (index(x))

∆i,S0 (0)
x

x∈Sx

Y

=

e(g, g)r·qx (i)·∆i,Sx0 (0)

x∈Sx

= e(g, g)r·qz (0)
Once this returns a value for the root node, if it is not a blocking value, decryption on
the ciphertext can be performed. If it is not blocking then the result from the root node is
e(g, g)r·qR (0) = e(g, g)r·s = A. Decryption on the entire ciphertext is defined by
C̃
e(C,D)
A

2.6

=

C̃
e(hs ,g (α+r)/β )
e(g,g)r·s

=

M · e(g, g)α·s
β·s· α+r

β
e(g,g)
e(g,g)r·s

=

M · e(g, g)α·s
e(g,g)α·s ·e(g,g)r·s
e(g,g)r·s

=M

Delegation

˜ based on a
Delegation is a method which allows a user to generate another secret key, SK,
subset S̃ of the user’s attribute set S. This key is equal in privilege to that of a key with the
attribute set S̃ generated through an official key generation of section 2.3, but is able to be
generated by a user, without requiring the master key.
Similar to the key generation algorithm, the delegate key is generated by first randomly
choosing a value r̃ along with a random value r˜k for each attribute k within S̃. This creates
the delegate key
˜ = (D̃ = D · f r̃ , ∀k ∈ S̃ : D̃k = Dk · g r̃ · H(k)r˜k , D̃0 = D0 · g r˜k ).
SK
k
k
One point of note is that the toolkit implementation of CPABE, provided by [4], does
not contain support for this delegation method. Additional inspection shows that this could
present issues with collusion when this is used, due to the fact that a user can choose r̃ during this operation, and in turn be able to bind attributes maliciously. However, this is not
a direct issue due to the fact that the user generating these delegate keys already possesses
these attributes, and will achieve no additional benefit from knowing these values. There
are still issues though when the user creates delegate keys for multiple users and decides to
reuse the value of r̃. In this case, other users would not know that these delegate keys are
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malicious, and two delegate keys generated by the same user could be combined to gain
access to ciphertexts the delegate users should not have access to. At the same time, this is
a bit roundabout, as the user generating the delegate keys will always already have access
to decrypt any ciphertexts, and could instead share the plaintexts. Another detriment of the
delegation is with regards to key management strategies, as users could maliciously generate keys for themselves unknown to anyone else including the key management servers,
and subsequently keep these keys to use after they have been revoked.

2.7

Security

For CPABE, the security of it is proven by the authors under the generic group model [4].
Additionally, due to the random values used during the key generation and encryption,
care must be taken to ensure that all values are properly generated randomly, without the
worry of reuse, as that may cause collusion attacks to occur. With the hashing function
used, note that this needs to be public due to the fact that the encrypting users will need
to compute these values in order to properly encrypt their messages. This means one can
not put any security in the fact that these values will essentially be public. However, due
to the multiplications within the encryption and key generation functions, these values are
blinded and users are not able to use them to find out the other values they were multiplied
by. Additional properties for security related to the bilinear groups used are discussed in
section 3.4.

2.8

Example

Let an organization which is using CPABE to be split into four departments. These departments are engineering, marketing, accounting, and customer service. An example will
be shown of the attributes which users contain in their keys, as well as various ciphertext
access trees that can be satisfied by each of the keys. Each of the departments will have
separate subgroups and teams which need to communicate between each other (or with
another team). In the engineering department, these teams are design, programming, and
testing. Within accounting, the two teams are payroll and investment. Teams could also
use specific attributes associated with projects they are working on, which could stretch
within departments. For example, the secret project could require communications between programming, testing, and marketing. The default CPABE scheme allows attributes
to be produced as needed, without all of them required to be defined during the setup step.
Additional numeric properties are assigned to each user, such as executive level, and
starting date. Executive level starts at 0, and increases by one for each lower level employee. This means that the CEO/President would have a value of 0, vice presidents a level
of 1, and lower employees higher numbers. To adhere to the convention required by bag of
bits, a four bit value would be used to represent this value, meaning there is also a limitation
of 15 being the highest possible level. If more levels were to be added at a later date, each
user’s key would need to be regenerated in order to maintain consistency with the bits used
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Alice
Bob
Charles
Dan
Erin
Francis
Greg
Heather

Eng
+
+
+

Departments
Market Account

+
+

+
+
+

CS

Des

+

+

Teams
Prog Test Pay
+
+
+

+

+
+

Invest

+
+

+
+

+

Projects
Secret Web
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+

Numeric
EL
5
4
2
0
4
3
4
5

Table 2.1: Example of Users and Attributes

to represent the property within other keys as well as access trees. Hire dates would be
represented as 32 bit values consistent with modern operating systems, at midnight UTC of
the date the employee began employment with the company. Note that this is not desirable
in this example, as a 32 bit value requires 32 attributes for the bag of bits representation,
so performance would be hindered because all keys would have many more nodes in the
access tree than actual properties.
We will now look at several users within the scheme, and three ciphertexts with varied
access trees, that they will or will not be able to decrypt. Alice is a member within the
programming team, hired on June 4, 2012. She is focusing on the web development project,
and has an executive level of 5. On the other hand, her direct manager Bob, leader of the
project, would have the same attributes as Alice, but his executive level would be 4. Charles
is a manager of the secret project, in the marketing department, with an executive level of
2. Additionally, Dan is the CEO of the company, and this allows him to have an executive
level of 0, as well as membership in all departments. Note that the CPABE scheme does
not restrict attributes based on the possession of other attributes, or that membership in
one department does not prevent a user from having membership in other departments
in his or her key. The attributes that each user possesses, as well as several other users, is
summarized in table 2.1. For the boolean attributes, + represents that the user in that row has
that attribute, and a blank box represents that the user does not possess that attribute. For
numeric attributes, the corresponding decimal value is shown. The hire date is not shown,
as it is usually not a good metric for measuring access to files, as a company could have a
recently hired CEO who would not be able to access some files, which is counterintuitive.
These users are attempting to communicate with each other using CPABE. Usually,
most of the files being encrypted are restricted between the employees of each project,
while others are restricted by the department (such as accounting). Let Alice encrypt a
file discussing technical details of the project she is working on, meaning that it is only
relevant to employees of the programming team, and is not needed by any other teams or
departments. The second restriction would be that no employees with a lower executive
level would be able to decrypt the file, such as new employees who did not have access
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AND

Engineering

Programming

Web Team

Executive Level ≤ 5

Figure 2.2: Access Tree of First Example

to project details, for example. Because of this, to ensure that only authorized employees could access the file, she would set the access tree of this file to “ENGINEERING
and PROGRAMMING and WEB TEAM and EXECUTIVE LEVEL≤5”. With this access structure, the users from table 2.1 who contain the proper attributes to decrypt the file
would be Alice, Bob, and Dan. The access tree associated with this file is shown in figure
2.2. Note that there would be a bag of bits used to represent the numeric value, which
would in total take 5 leaf nodes and 3 non-leaf nodes to fully represent that attribute.
A second example file could be between the high level members of the secret project,
regardless of team. Charles wants to send a message to the members of the project, except only for the executives who have an executive level of 3 or less. The access tree for
this would simply be “SECRETPROJECT and EXECUTIVE LEVEL≤3”. With this tree,
Charles, Dan and Francis would be the only users from Table 2.1 with properties able to
decrypt this message.
The final example message that could be used in this scheme would be composed by
Francis, discussing her findings about possible investments for the secret project. This
message has a much more complex access tree, requiring either a vice-president (executive
level of 1), other members of the same project, also working in investment, or a somewhat lower executive within the accounting department, regardless of team. This access
tree would be “EXECUTIVE LEVEL ≤ 1 or (SECRETPROJECT and INVESTMENT) or
(ACCOUNTING and EXECUTIVE LEVEL ≤ 3)”. The access tree associated with this
structure is shown in Figure 2.3. Again, the bag of bits details covering the value of the
executive level are not shown. The check for “EXECUTIVE LEVEL ≤ 1 would take 3
leafs and 1 non-leaf node to represent, while the check for “EXECUTIVE LEVEL ≤ 3”
would take 2 leafs and 1 non-leaf node to represent. This file would then be able to be
decrypted by Dan or Francis only.

2.9
2.9.1

Limitations
Negative Attributes and Nonmonotonic Access Trees

One of the major restrictions, outside of the lack of key revocation (see Chapter 6), is the
structure of the access trees, and how it is unable to handle negative attributes. A negative
attribute is when one wishes to restrict access based on a certain property. For example, if
someone wants to restrict access to a file for all users of the engineering department, the
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OR

Executive Level ≤ 1

AND

AND
Secret Project

Investment

Accounting

Executive Level ≤ 3

Figure 2.3: Access Tree of Final Example

access tree “not ENGINEERING” would not be valid within the CPABE scheme. In order
to allow this scheme to be valid, they would have to explicitly label all other departments
with an or gate, such as “ACCOUNTING or MARKETING or CUSTOMER SERVICE”,
in the case of the previous example scheme. While this doesn’t seem bad from this example, in applications in which there are many attributes at that same level, it would create
extremely large access trees.
This restriction is due to the definition of monotonic access trees which are used to
represent access trees within CPABE. By the definition of monotonic access trees from
section 2.1, if a set of properties S satisfies the access tree, any superset S̃ of those properties
will also satisfy the access tree. When NOT gates are used within access trees, such as in
the example above, and S does not contain the property “ENGINEERING” but satisfies the
access tree, adding “ENGINEERING” to S̃ will make it such that the monotonic property
is violated.
2.9.2

Ciphertext Size

A second limitation is the size of the ciphertext. Regardless of message size, the ciphertext
begins at 630 bytes due to the overhead needed to handle it. Additionally, every attribute
produces 250-300 [36] more bytes, which can make expressive policies require a large
overhead. Bethencourt claims that for an access formula of n attributes, the complexity of
encryption and decryption becomes O(n3.42 ) [19]. When trying to transfer messages over
a limited medium, this overhead makes CPABE not a good candidate to be used for that
application.
However, some variations of CPABE, such as the work of Goyal [14], present the ability
to create an upper bound on the size of the access tree, and subsequently, the ciphertext.
The requirement for a bound like this is by limiting the number of nodes in the access
tree during the Setup step, as well as the maximum tree depth and maximum number of
child nodes. A transformation is then used to ensure that all trees meet this desired format.
Depending on the application using CPABE, these limits may not be feasible.
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Chapter 3
Bilinear Groups
Bilinear groups were first used in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin [5] in order to provide an
efficient implementation of the Identity Based Encyryption scheme proposed by Shamir in
1984 [31]. Soon after, the usage of these groups expanded to digital signature schemes,
such as the BLS signature scheme [6]. The key reason for this usage is the fact that not
only do these groups support Identity Based Encryption, they support it in a hierarchical
manner such as that of an access tree, shown in section 2.1.
Definition 3.1 A bilinear mapping, or bilinear pairing on two input groups G1 and G2
with generators g1 and g2 , respectively, and output group GT as the efficiently computable
e : G1 × G2 → GT
The function e(x, y) will compute a value of GT from a value x ∈ G1 and y ∈ G2 .
For the scope of this thesis, only bilinear groups over finite elliptic curves are considered, except for a brief discussion of other pairings, covered in section 5.2. Therefore, the
groups G1 and G2 will each be a set of points on an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp ,
and the output group GT is elements of the extension field Fpk , where k is a small integer.
The value of k, also known as the embedding the degree of the curve, is defined based on
the type of curve that is chosen (see Chapter 5).
Based on the curves chosen, a pairing is referred to as symmetric if G1 = G2 , and
nonsymmetric otherwise. The definition of CPABE in the previous chapter assumes that
the pairing is symmetric, due to the flipping of elements in the pairing as seen during the
DecryptNode function in section 2.5. However, this does not prevent asymmetric curves
from being used for CPABE, and by careful rearrangement of the pairings during the DecryptNode stage of decryption, shown in section 5.3, these pairings can also be used for
CPABE.
Ideally, one would like to find a bilinear map that is self-bilinear, that is G1 = G2 = GT .
However, there are no known examples of such a mapping, and Cheon and Lee [10] have
stated that while some mappingss are possible that meet these properties, they are not
cryptographically useful, and can easily be rewritten as a mapping that is not self-bilinear.
They then proved that such a mapping cannot exist for the Computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption in the group to be hard (see Section 3.4).
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3.1

Properties

Two main properties are defined for a bilinear pairing, known as bilinearity and nondegeneracy. Assuming that the pairing is symmetric, meaning that both inputs are elements of
the group G with generator g, these properties are as such.
Definition 3.2 A bilinear mapping is bilinear if
e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g)ab ∀a, b ∈ Z
Definition 3.3 The bilinear mapping is nongenerate if and only if
e(g, g) 6= 1
Additionally, the pairings are also distributive, meaning that e(xy, z) = e(x, z) · e(y, z),
which is also shown during the DecryptNode step in section 2.5.
Gagne [12] makes note of one property that is also defined by the non-degeneracy,
which is the fact that assuming that g is a generator of G, then e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
When a pairing is asymmetric, a distortion map is defined as the relationship between
G1 and G2 . Assume that g1 and g2 are generators of G1 and G2 , respectively. A distortion
map is a mapping φ : G2 → G1 such that g1 = φ(g2 ) [22]. By the application of such
a distortion map, it is guaranteed that the two points used for the pairing are linearly independent. If the points are linearly dependent, then pairing output will be degenerate, or
1.

3.2

Generic Bilinear Groups

Lynn states that the restrictions from the previous section are too constraining, and pairings
can be performed on generic elliptic curve groups that instead satisfy the properties below.
For a generic bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT , the properties can be rewritten as follows.
Definition 3.4 A generic bilinear map is bilinear if
e(g1a , g2b ) = e(g1 , g2 )ab ∀a, b ∈ Z, g1 ∈ G1 , g2 ∈ G2
Definition 3.5 A generic bilinear map is nondegenerate if
e(g1 , g2 ) = 1GT ∀g2 ∈ G2 if and only if g1 = 1G1 and
e(g1 , g2 ) = 1GT ∀g1 ∈ G1 if and only if g2 = 1G2
By using these properties instead to define the mapping, the usage of asymmetric curves
is allowed. If the original equations for the map properties are used (3.2 and 3.3), then it
is impossible to hash to G2 securely. Depending on the application of the cryptosystem,
this may be ideal, but sometimes it is not ideal. If hashing to all groups is required of the
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scheme (as is the case for CPABE), then the generic properties for the pairing must be used.
This only applies to hashing to elliptic curves, and may not be the case for possible other
pairing groups, but that is not covered within this thesis.
Additional benefits are allowed by this generic definition. We are no longer restricted
to only groups of prime order. These properties are defined for any groups where G1 and
GT are of order r, and G2 is of an order dividing r. Additionally, this allows G2 to not be a
cyclic group. One point of note, however, is that given the generators of the input groups,
the output of their pairing is not guaranteed to be a generator of GT . The pairing result
e(g1 , g2 ) may then only generate an order r subgroup of GT [22].

3.3

Ideal Properties

Selection of the pairing curve is dependent on the requirements of the cryptosystem it is
being used in. Lynn states that ideally, three properties would be satisfied for cryptographic
usage of bilinear pairings.
1. G1 and G2 are cyclic
2. One can securely hash to G1 and G2
3. There exists a one-way isomorphism φ : G2 → G1
However, no known pairing satisfies all three of these properties. On the other hand,
one can easily find a pairing that satisfies any two of these [22]. Selection of a curve
is dependent on both which of these properties are met by that curve, as well as which
security problems one needs to be hard in the scheme.

3.4

Security

Three basic security problems are at the core of the usage of elliptic curves and subsequently bilinear pairings in cryptography. The first of these is the discrete logarithm problem, which is a problem used for many cryptosystems.
Definition 3.6 (Discrete Logarithm Problem) Given g and g x , find x.
Ideally, this problem is only solvable by brute force, or multiplying successive powers of
g until g x is obtained. While there are attacks which make the problem computable in less
than brute force, the assumption is that this problem is still hard, as no polynomial time
algorithms are known. In the case of bilinear pairings, this problem is hard in both the
elliptic curve elements used as the inputs, as well as on the pairing itself.
Two other closely related security problems are also defined at the core of the security
of many schemes, the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem and the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem.
Definition 3.7 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) “Given g, g x , and g y , find g xy ”.
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Definition 3.8 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem) “Given g, g x , g y and g z , determine if
z = xy”
Note that these problems are closely related, and any break to the discrete log problem
would subsequently break both CDH and DDH [22].
With the nature of the bilinear pairings, there are also modifications to CDH and DDH
that take advantage of these pairings, providing additional security problems outside of
the three major ones. The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman is the equivalent of the CDH problem,
defined below.
Definition 3.9 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem) “Given g, g x , g y , and g z , find e(g, g)xyz ”.
Once again, there is another duality of the DDH for bilinear maps, known as the Bilinear
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem.
Definition 3.10 (Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem) “Given g, g x , g y , g z and
e(g, g)w , determine if w = xyz”.
Just as is the case with the original CDH and DDH problems, any attack which makes
the discrete log problem easy would make both of the bilinear problems easy as well.
The bilinear equivalents incorporate a third input element, to challenge the properties of
the bilinear pairings. Both of these bilinear problems are assumed to be hard within the
bilinear map setting [3].
Within the scope of CPABE, some of the aforementioned problems may be easy to
solve. Just because a problem is made easy within the scope of a scheme does not mean
the scheme is inherently insecure. For example, Boneh and Franklin [5] state that in a
symmetric bilinear pairing, DDH is easy. This is due to the application of pairings to solve
this problem. Take the values given (g, g x , g y and g z ) and apply the pairing to g x and g y . By
the bilinearity property, e(g x , g y ) = e(g, g)xy . With the other values given, apply a pairing
again, to find e(g, g z ) = e(g, g)z . If the output of both of these pairings are equal, then
it is true that z = xy, thus DDH is easy. However, on the other hand, CDH is still hard
to compute. The ability to solve DDH is only easy due to the fact that g z is known. The
internals of the pairing does not allow the values to be easily reversed, and even though
e(g x , g y ) = e(g, g)xy = e(g, g xy ), that does not allow g xy to be known.
Definition 3.11 A group G where DDH is easy but CDH is hard is referred to as a Gap
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group [3].
As for the BDDH problem, Boneh and Franklin yet again state that the hardness of
this problem is equivalent to the hardness of the CDH within pairings. Additionally, any
possible algorithms that make CDH easy would also make BDDH easy. Finally, the fact
that DDH is easy in the input group does not mean it is easy in the output group of the
pairing, as if it was, then it would be easy to invert the bilinear pairing [12].
For asymmetric pairings, Lynn mentions that another security problem can be defined,
the Computational Co-Diffie-Hellman problem.
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Definition 3.12 (Computational Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem) “Given g1 , g1x ∈ G1 and
g2 ∈ G2 , find g2x ”.
As mentioned previously, the fact that the internals of the pairings can not be computed
this way make it such that this problem is hard for the aymmetric pairing. Similarly, the
Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman problem can also be defined.
Definition 3.13 (Decisional Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem) “Given g1 , g1x ∈ G1 and g2 , g2y , g2xy ∈
G2, distinguish g1 and g1x from g2 , g2y and g2z ”.
Additionally, the hardness of DDH in an asymmetric mapping is dependent on whether
the third property from section 3.3 regarding an isomorphism is met. If such an isomorphism exists, then DDH is easy in the asymmetric mapping. If there is no such isomorphism, DDH is hard [3].
Boyen [7] states that for generic bilinear groups, if any of these assumptions are not
hard for those generic groups, there is no reason to believe that the scheme will be secure
for lesser models. Additionally, proof of security restricted to only the generic group model
is not strong enough to guarantee security in other models, as the generic model assumes
that a malicious user needs access to an oracle in order to perform any of the operations
such as bilinear pairings, which is not usually the case in attacks. This is an issue with
the inital implementation of CPABE, as its security is only proven for this generic group
model.
Waters realizes this in his own modification to CPABE [33], and presents the parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, which takes q + 2 random elements of Zp , a, s, b1 , ..., bq ,
and the generator of the group G, where p is the prime order of the group. With this,
security can be proven over a more secure model than the generic group.
Definition 3.14 (Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption) Given g, g s ,
q
q+2
2
q+1
g a , ..., g a , g a , ..., g a q , a challenger is unable to tell the difference between e(g, g)a s
and a random element in the output group of the bilinear mapping with any polynomial
time algorithm.
Finally, these security problems are in no way restrictive, and only the ones closest to
CPABE have been covered within this thesis. Hohenburger presents many more complexity
assumptions in [16], as well as a discussion of the relationship between these problems.
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Chapter 4
Elliptic Curves
This chapter covers the basics of elliptic curves, and how pairings are performed on elements of the elliptic curve. It shows an example of both point counting as well as pairing
on a trivial curve.
Definition 4.1 An elliptic curve over a finite field Fq , where q is a prime greater than 3, is
the set of points (X, Y ) that satisfy
E : Y 2 = X 3 + aX + b

(4.1)

as well as a point of infinity, O, also used as the identity element, for a given a, b ∈ Fq .
Definition 4.2 The discriminant of the elliptic curve is ∆ = 4a3 + 27b2 .
When ∆ = 0, then the curve has a repeated root, and is referred to as a singular curve.
Only nonsingular curves are cryptographically useful, as singular curves provide no extra
benefit over finite fields, and have slower operations. One may notice that the definiton of
E does not account for variations such as a rotation, or shearing of the curve. However,
there exists an affine linear transformation between such a curve and a curve in the above
format, which allows one to easily find an equivalence of the points. Because of this, the
assumption is made that all curves referred to in this thesis have been transformed into this
format [22].
Two examples of elliptic curves are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.

4.1

Point Addition

The points of an elliptic curve form an additive group. Because the group operation is
addition, multiplication of a point by a constant is equivalent to exponentiation within
integers. This multiplication is composed by a series of point additions on the curve. This
is performed by doubling a point, P , to get 2P , and doubling again to get 4P, 8P , and so
on, adding the results together to get points in between. Addition between two points is
defined by the Chord-Tangent Law.
Definition 4.3 (Chord-Tangent Law) The addition between any two points P and Q, P 6=
Q, on the curve can be found geometrically by drawing a line on the elliptic curve between
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Figure 4.1: Elliptic Curve y 2 = x3 + x

Figure 4.2: Elliptic Curve y 2 = x3 − x
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the two points, and finding a third point, R = (x, y) on the curve that the line intersects.
The sum P + Q is equal to the inverse (x, −y).
The proof that a third point exists on the line is not shown within the scope of this thesis.
There are a few cases, however, that change this definition of addition. The first occurs
when P = (x, y) and Q = (x, −y), as the line between the two points is vertical, and
does not intersect any third point on the curve. In this case, the result of the addition is
defined as O. A second variation is when adding P = Q, or finding 2P . One first takes
the line tangent to the curve at P , and there is a second point of intersection between the
line and the curve, which when the y value is inverted is the result of the addition. The
final difference occurs when one of the points is O, in which case basic axioms apply, and
P + O = P.
One can numerically compute the point additions directly through the following equations. When one of the points is equal to O, identity operations do not require these steps.
When adding P = (x1 , y1 ) to Q = (x2 , y2 ), one can compute the slope of the line between
the two points. If P = Q, let the slope of the tangent line be
λ=

3x21 + a
.
2y1

(4.2)

Otherwise, the slope of the line between the two distinct points is
λ=

y2 − y1
.
x 2 − x1

(4.3)

Regardless of which equation was needed to find the slope of the line, the coordinates of
the sum, (x3 , y3 ) can be found by computing
x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3 ) − y1

4.2

Point Finding and Counting

Due to the fact that the elliptic curves are defined over a finite integer field, and the fact
that not all integers are valid coordinates for points on these curves, an algorithm to map
any values of the finite field, K, to a point on the curve is needed. Let x be the value of the
finite field that we are trying to map to the elliptic curve. The first step is to simply solve
the curve equation (4.1) for Y by substituting the value of x into the equation, and taking
the square root of Y 2 .
Given a value of Y√2 , the square roots are found using the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm
[22], which finds b = a, where b ∈ Fq and q is prime. The algorithm first finds a value
g ∈ Fq that does not have a square root, which also means g (q−1)/2 = −1. Additionally,
there is no requirement that this g be unique for each square root being found, and can
easily be precomputed. Additionally, since q is odd (as the only even prime is trivial), write
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i

q − 1 = 2s t. For all values of i from 2 to s, if (ag −e )(q−1)/2 6= 1, set an intermediate value
e ← 2i−1 + e. Once this is looped for all values of i, set h ← ag −e , and the square root
b = g e/2 h(t+1)/2 .
Algorithm 1 Tonelli-Shanks Algorithm
Randomly choose an element g ∈ Fq that is not a square.
Because of this, find an odd t such that q − 1 = 2s t
e←0
for i ← 2 to s do
i
if (ag −e )(q−1)/2 6= 1 then
e ← 2i−1 + e
end if
end for
h ← ag −e
b ← g e/2 h(t+1)/2
Return b

If a valid square root is found, we have found two points on the curve, (x, Y ) and
(x, −Y ). Occasionally this will only produce a single point, where Y = 0, and the point
lies on the x-axis. However, this can only occur for a maximum of three values of x for
each curve. If a square root is not found, then there are no points for that x value, and a
new x must be chosen. From this, hashing to an elliptic curve is possible. One possible
algorithm first uses a hashing function to generate a value of x from the message that one is
trying to hash to a point. Using this value of x, deterministically generate a value of x ∈ Fq
until a valid value of y is found. From that, one of the values of y is again deterministically
chosen from the two, and the hash output is the point (x, y).
Another method of finding the square roots is by determining the quadratic residues of
the values obtained by substituting x into the elliptic curve equation.
Definition 4.4 A value z is a quadratic residue mod p if and only if z (p−1)/2 = 1 mod p.
Additionally, an extension of this allows efficient computation of the square roots if the
condition p = 3 mod 4 is also met. Let z equal a value found by substituting x into an
elliptic curve over Fp , where p = 3 mod 4 and is prime. If z is a quadratic residue of the
curve over this field, the square roots of z are ±z (p+1)/4 mod p = ±z 3 mod p [32]. If z
is a valid quadratic residue, the curve has two points for the value of x used. If it is not,
then there are no points for the value of x. An exception to this occurs when z = 0, as there
is only a single point on the elliptic curve for this value, at (x,0).
Lynn [22] notes that these hashing and point finding algorithms allow an efficient manner for selecting a random point on the curve. One first chooses a random value of x ∈ K,
and attempts to solve the curve equation for Y . Repeat these steps until an x that yields a
valid value of Y is found. One this occurs, randomly select one of the two solutions of Y ,
and return the random point as (x, y). This is not truely random, as it prevents the point at
infinity from being chosen via this algorithm, as well as the fact that points where Y = 0
have a higher probability of being picked. This can be ignored because rarely in cryptography is the point at infinity desired for a random point, and the definition of the elliptic
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curves will have at most three points which are of a higher probability, almost negligible
for the number of points on the curve. By having this algorithm for finding a random point
instead being deterministic, hashing to points on the curve is now allowed. This algorithm
would then take the input, map it to x, and if no points are found for x, deterministically
modify the value and repeat from the beginning until a point is found. While point counting algorithms are not explicitly covered in this thesis, the number of points on the curve is
roughly the size of the finite field, or q k .
Definition 4.5 The order n of an elliptic curve E, is equal to the number of points on the
curve, including the point at infinity.
Definition 4.6 The order r of a point P on an elliptic curve is the minimum positive integer
k such that kP = O.
Because of the fact that every point on E generates a cyclic group G, this cyclic group is
what is used for cryptographic operations. The difficulty with these operations is ensuring
that a randomly chosen or hashed points lie within G and not elsewhere on the curve. To
do so, find a prime r such that r | n, but r2 - n. Operations will all be of points on E and G
of order r. For the above mentioned random elements, proceed normally, except multipling
by n/r after a random or hashed point on E is found [22].

4.3

Example

Let E be the elliptic curve defined by y 2 = x3 + x over the finite field F11 . Note that this
curve is the same that is used by the initial implementation of CPABE [4], albeit over a
much smaller finite field for ease of this example. Since p = 11 = 3 mod 4, the quadratic
residue method can be used to find the points on this curve. In this case, a value z is a
quadratic residue if z (p−1)/2 = z 5 = 1 mod 11. Table 4.1 shows the values of z that
correspond to quadratic residues, and Table 4.2 shows how these residues are used to find
the points of the elliptic curve.
With all of the points listed in Table 4.2, the number of points on this elliptic curve is
12, the 11 points shown in the table and the point at infinity. The order of each point is then
determined by successive additions. Additions are performed due to the fact that the group
operation is addition for elliptic curves.
To find the order of an element on the elliptic curve, successive point additions are
performed until the point at infinity is obtained. Begin with the point (5,3), denoted by P
for this example. Using equation 4.2 due to the fact that the points added are the same, the
λ value obtained for 2P is (3 · 52 + 1)/(2 · 3) mod 11 = 10 · 6−1 . Because this calculation
is over a finite field, the modulus must be applied, and the inverse is used to represent
division in such fields. Solving for the inverse, it is found that λ = 9. With this value, the
coordinates of the new point can be found, with x3 = 92 − 5 − 5 = 71 = 5 mod 11 and
y3 = 9(5 − 5) − 3 = 8, and 2P = (5, 8).
Now extending on this, one can find 3P = P + 2P using the same method. When this
is applied, however, one finds that λ can not be found due to the fact that the denominator
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z
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

z 5 mod 11
0
1
10
1
1
1
10
10
10
1
10

Quadratic Residue?
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

Table 4.1: Quadratic Residues of Elliptic Curves over F11

x
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

z = (x3 + x) mod 11
0
2
10
8
2
9
2
9
3
1
9

Quadratic Residue?
Exception
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

z3
0
±3
±3
±5
±1
±3

Points
(0,0)
(5,3), (5,8)
(7,3), (7,8)
(8,5), (8,6)
(9,1), (9,10)
(10,3), (10,8)

Table 4.2: Points on Elliptic Curve y 2 = x3 + x over F11
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requires the computation of 0−1 . In this case, note that (5, 8) = (5, −3), and that y1 =
−y2 , meaning that by definition of elliptic curve addition, the result is the point at infinity.
Because the point at infinity was obtained at 3P , the order of P is 3.

4.4

Pairing

Two pairing algorithms, Weil and Tate, are used for calculation of pairings over elliptic
curves. Instead of directly using points from the curve, they use r-torsion points of the
curve as the input fields, and the output is an rth root of unity of the finite field.
4.4.1

Torsion Points

Definition 4.7 An r-torsion point is the set of points P such that rP = O.
The set of r-torsion points can also be denoted by E(K)[r] or E[r], where K = Fqm is the
finite field the elliptic curve is over. In other terms, this means that the order of P is r or a
factor of r. For all curves, the only r-torsion points which are cryptographically useful are
those where r and q are coprime.
Definition 4.8 An elliptic curve E is supersingular if and only if the only pth point of
torsion for any prime p is the point at infinity, or the number of points on the curve
#E(Fpm ) = pm + 1 − t, for p | t [13].
Contrary to its name, a supersingular curve is not a singular curve. Any nonsupersingular
curve is referred to as an ordinary curve. Additionally, for any curve E, there exists a value
k such that E(Fqk )[r] contains r2 points, and no more r-torsion points will exist for any
greater value of k.
Care must be taken to ensure that r is coprime to q, or the set of points is vulnerable to
a anomalous attack, which will solve the discrete log within E[r] in linear time. This can
be avoided by ensuring that the order of the curve is coprime to q [22].
4.4.2

Embedding Degree

With this, we can define the concept of the embedding degree of E.
Definition 4.9 The embedding degree of E is the smallest value of k such that all r2 rtorsion points of the subgroup G ⊂ E(Fq ) of order r and r - q − 1 exist on the curve.
This value is also the minimum value of k where r | q k − 1, allowing this to be easily
computed. In terms of an elliptic curve pairings, this degree is approximately the ratio of
the input elements to output element sizes, in bits. For example, if the embedding degree of
E is 2, then typical pairings will consist 512-bit elements as inputs, and 1024-bit elements
for the output. One method of finding this embedding degree is just solving n | q k − 1,
which also ensures that the coprime requirement from section 4.4.1 is also met.
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In the curves used in the PBC Library, embedding degrees up to 12 are supported,
depending on the type of curve. One point of note is the fact that there are no known supersingular curves with an embedding degree higher than 6 [22]. If an application requires
curves of a higher degree, or if attacks are found such that the security of lower embedding degree is compromised, then only ordinary curves would be able to meet the security
properties needed for the bilinear maps.
4.4.3

Distortion Maps

Distortion maps are used for symmetric pairings, as a means of creating an isomorphism
between the two inputs. This is denoted as Ψ(x, y) = (−x, iy), and is used in the bilinear
mapping as e(P, Q) = f (P, Ψ(Q)), where f is the Weil or Tate pairing function [22].
The usage of these distortion maps is required due to the fact that when in a symmetric
mapping, the pairing e(P, P ) = 1, which violates the degeneracy property for the bilinear
pairing. Therefore, distortion maps are needed in order to guarantee the two input points
for a symmetric pairing are linearly independent. Maas states that this map is only valid
when the curves are over an integer field of prime order p, and p ≡ 3 mod (4) [24].
4.4.4

Weil Pairing

Definition 4.10 The Weil pairing is a mapping of two r-torsion points to an element of the
finite field as such:
f : E[r] × E[r] → Fqk
The algorithm computing the Weil Pairing is based on the evaluation of two rational
functions fP and fQ . Details behind how such rational functions are defined, and details
such as the Poles and Zeroes of such functions, is left to Lynn’s work [22].
To compute this pairing of two input points P and Q, two additional points R and
S ∈ E[Fqk ] must be chosen, where S 6= R, P + R, P + R − Q, or R − Q. Following that,
define the rational function fP with divisor (fP ) = (P + R)r /(R)r , and fQ with divisor
(fQ ) = (Q + S)r /(S)r . With these two functions, the pairing output is the value f (P, Q)
obtained from equation 4.4.
f (P, Q) =
4.4.5

fP (Q + S)/fP (S)
fQ (P + R)/fQ (R)

(4.4)

Tate Pairing

Definition 4.11 The Tate pairing is:
f : E[r] ∩ E(K) × E(K)/rE(K) → K ∗ /K ∗r
Note that in this case, only a single point of torsion is used for an input, as opposed to
two of which are used as the inputs of the Weil pairing. The second point can be any point
on E(K), regardless of order.
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Similar to the Weil pairing, computation of the Tate pairing begins by defining a rational
function fP with divisor (fP ) = (P )r . Note that this again only requires a single function
as such, compared to the two required for the Weil pairing. Once such a function is found,
the pairing chooses R, a point of E(K), where R 6= P, P − Q, O, or −Q. The result from
the pairing, f (P, Q), is shown by equation 4.5
f (P, Q) =
4.4.6

fP (Q + R)
fP (R)

(4.5)

Miller’s Algorithm

Miller’s algorithm is designed for computing the pairing of two points, using linear functions based on the input points. The linear functions are defined on points as such:
1. L: The line between the points U and V on the curve as defined by the Chord-Tangent
law (see Section 4.1), in the form LU,V = 0.
2. T: The line tangent to the curve, with only point of intersection at U = V . Since there
is only one point of intersection, this can be defined easily as TU = 0. Additionally,
TU = LU,U .
3. V: The vertical line between the points U and V = −U , in the form VU = 0. Similar
to the case with T , VU = LU,−U . If U = −U then TU = VU [22].
Evaluation of these functions is performed on a point S = (X, Y ). These evaluations
are shown clearly in the example shown in section 4.4.7.
This leads us to Miller’s algorithm for finding the Tate pairing on points P and Q. Note
that a modification of this algorithm can be used to find the Weil pairing as well, but the
Weil pairing is not used for the pairings of curves used in this thesis. The value ri referred
to in this algorithm is the binary bit i in the order r of the point P , in the form r = rt ...r0 .
Algorithm 2 Miller’s Algorithm
x←1
Z←P
for i ← t − 1 to 0 do
x ← x2 · TZ (Q)/V2Z (Q)
Z ← 2Z
if ri = 1 then
x ← x · LZ,P (Q)/VZ+P (Q)
Z ←Z +P
end if
end for

Following the completion of this algorithm, one final exponentiation is performed in
k
order to generate the output of the pairing. The output of the pairing is x(q −1)/r .

28

4.4.7

Example

A trivial example of the Tate pairing using Miller’s algorithm is now shown. The same
curve used from section 4.3 is used, E : y 2 = x3 + x over the field Fq , where q = 11.
As shown in section 4.3, the order of the curve is n = 12. The first step in computing
this pairing is to find a large prime r that divides n. Due to the fact that this is such a trivial
example, the largest prime which is a factor of n is r = 3, which is the value that will be
used for this pairing.
Once r is found, it must be tested to find a k value such that r divides q k − 1 but r2
does not divide that value. Starting with k = 1, q − 1 = 10. Since 3 does not divide into
10, k = 1 is not valid. Incrementing for k = 2, q 2 − 1 = 120, and because r | 120 while
r2 = 9 - 120, k = 2 is the smallest value which satisfies these properties. That means that
the embedding degree for pairings on this curve is 2.
The next step is to find all of the r-torsion points on E. Using the list of points found
from the previous example in section 4.3, the only points of order 3 are (5, 3) and (5, 8).
Due to the fact that r is prime, there are no other factors of r, so one does not have to check
for points with order equal to a factor. What this means, however, is that Tate pairings are
only defined for P ∈ E[r], but Q is not restricted, and can be any other point on this curve.
Note that if the Weil pairing was to be computed, the selection of points would be restricted
to P, Q ∈ E[r].
Now we will compute the Tate pairing of P = (5, 3) and Q = φ(P ) = (6, 3i) using
Miller’s Algorithm. The algorithm starts by setting x = 1 and Z = P . It then loops through
values of t. Since r = 3 = 112 , t = 1, and r1 = 1, r0 = 1. The algorithm will only loop a
single time, for i = 0.
With the loop at i = 0, x = x2 · TZ (Q)/V2Z (Q). Since x = 1 to start, we can ignore
the x values and just compute the two linear functions. TZ = TP = the line tangent to
P = 2x + y + 4. When evaluated at Q, this output is 2 · 6 + 3i + 4 = 16 + 3i = 5 + 3i
when simplified for the finite field used. The next function needed is V2Z . Since Z = P ,
2Z = 2P = (5, 8). This works out to be the same vertical line through P , and the function
for this line is x + 7, which when evaluated at Q gives the value 2. Miller’s algorithm now
computes (5 + 3i)/2 = (5 + 3i)(2)−1 = 8 + 7i. The algorithm then sets Z = 2Z = (5, 8),
and checks if r0 = 1. Since this value is true, the if statement is then executed as well.
The value x · LZ,P (Q)/VZ+P (Q) needs to be computed. Because Z = (5, 8) = 2P for this
statement, LZ,P = VP = x + 7. Additionally, since Z = 2P , Z + P = 3P = O because
P is a 3-torsion point. In this case, this statement would be the equivalent of dividing by
zero. In order to perform this calculation, this zero value is instead set to 1, equivalent to
the division just not occuring. Still, L(Q) needs to be evaluated, and this value is found to
be 2. This means that x = x · 2 = (5 + 3i). Since this is the final iteration of the loop, the
final x value, 5 + 3i, is the result of the algorithm.
k
The final step of the pairing is to then find xq −1/r = x40 = 5 + 3i. To ensure that this
pairing is correct, one important step is to ensure that (5 + 3i)r = (5 + 3i)3 = 1, which
is true. If this value was not equal to 1, then the output of the pairing would definitely be
incorrect due to the fact that the output would not reside in the output field defined by the
Tate pairing.
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Chapter 5
Group Selection
While many different types of curves have been proved to be cryptographically useful in
the scope of bilinear pairings, there is limited research published regarding the performance
of these different curves (or a mapping outside of elliptic curves) within CPABE.
This chapter starts off by introducing the types of bilinear pairings supported in Lynn’s
PBC library [23], and a brief summary of how these curves are found or generated. Following that, a small discussion regarding the usage of maps other than elliptic curves is
provided. This section is followed by a proof to show that asymmetric pairings are possible
for usage in CPABE.
The rest of the chapter regards performance analysis performed for different types of
curves supported in the PBC library, both symmetric and asymmetric curves. Previous
work is discussed, and a detailed analysis of speed and size is given for these curves within
the scope of CPABE. The chapter concludes with recommendations for group selection
based on the application of CPABE.

5.1

Elliptic Curves

The Pairing Based Cryptography Library [23] was designed to support seven types of elliptic curves as the underlying fields for the pairings, denoted type A through type G. Of
these curves, types A,B, and C are symmetric pairings over supersingular curves, and types
D through G are asymmetric pairings on ordinary curves.
5.1.1

Supersingular Curves

Type A Curves

A Type A curve is an elliptic curve of the form
y 2 = x3 + ax, a ∈ Zp .
over a finite field Fq2 , where q is prime and q = 3 mod 4. The values of a that provide
the best performance are −3, 1, and −1 [22]. However, in the library that is used for the
CPABE implementation, this is hardcoded to only support the value a = 1, as it enables
certain optimizations. These curves have an embedding degree of 2, and also allow easy
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computation of the number of points on the curve, as #E(Fq ) = q + 1, and #E(Fq2 ) =
(q + 1)2 .
Type B Curves

Type B curves are curves satisfying
y 2 = x3 + b, b ∈ Zp
over the finite field Fq , where q = 2 mod 3. Similar to the Type A curves, pairings
using these curves are also of embedding degree 2. However, curves of this type are not
implemented in Lynn’s PBC library due to the fact that they provide little or no advantage
over the usage of Type A curves.
Type C Curves

A type C curve is a set of points which satisfies the equation
y 2 = x3 + 2x ± 1
over the finite field F3l . For these curves, they have an embedding degree of 6. However,
there are very few curves which are cryptographically useful in this type, and there are only
seven known curves which have a field size of less than or equal to 265 bits.
Similar to type B curves, type C curves are again not implemented in the main library
due to the fact that they are vulnerable to a Coppersmith attack on the low characteristic
field [22].
5.1.2

Ordinary Curves

Complex Multiplication

For many of the ordinary curves, a method known as complex multiplication is used in
order to find curves of a certain embedding degree with a specified order. The complex
multiplication equation is
DV 2 = 4q − t2
(5.1)
where D, V, q, and t are all integers, with q prime and D > 0 as well as no odd prime
squared divides D. From here, let j be any root of the Hilbert polynomial for D, except
for j = 0 or 1728, and k = j/(1728 − j). The elliptic curves formed by this complex
multiplication method are
E : y 2 = x3 + 3kc2 x + 2kc3
(5.2)
for any nonzero value of c. Curves formed by this method will have order q + t − 1 or
q − t − 1.
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Type D Curves

Type D, or MNT, curves have an embedding degree of k = 6, and are constructed by
substituting U = 3x ± 1, q = x2 + 1 and t = ±x + 1 into the complex multiplication
equation. From here, select a value of D and solve U 2 − 3DV 2 = −8. By the definition
of U , U = ±1 mod 3, so we can set x = (−1 ± U )/3. The next step is to check if q is
prime, and that q − t + 1 = q ∓ x has a large prime factor r. Another check needs to be
made to ensure that r - q j = 1 for any positive integer j < k. However, [22] notes that this
is unlikely to ever occur. Regardless, if these checks pass, then the complex multiplication
method will produce a curve of order q ∓ x.
Type E Curves

Curves denoted as Type E have an embedding degree of 1, and are designed by setting
t = 2, D = 7, and q = 28r2 h2 + 1 for a positive r and some value of h. The complex
multiplication equation becomes 7V 2 = 4(28(rh)2 + 1) − 4 after these substitutions, and
has a solution V = 4rh. Take H as the hilbert polynomial for D = 7, which is H(x) =
x + 3375, which will produce a curve y 2 = x3 + 3kx + 2k of order either q − 1 or q + 3. If
this curve has order q + 3, using the same k value found from the complex multiplication
method, instead use the curve y 2 = x3 + 3kc2 x + 2kc3 , where c is any quadratic nonresidue
in Fq .
Type F Curves

Type F curves, referred to as Barreto-Naehrig [2] curves, have a large embedding degree of
12, the largest possible for elliptic curves. These curves are once again designed through
the complex multiplication method, setting q = 36x4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x + 1, t = 6x2 + 1,
and D = 3, which has solution V = 6x2 + 4x + 1. Additionally, this has the property that
q + 1 − t | q 1 2 − 1. To produce a curve of Type F, take any value of x , and check that q is
prime for that value of x and that n = q − t + 1 has a large factor r, ideally prime. Then try
values of k until any point of E : y 2 = x3 + k has order n. This curve that satisfies these
properties is the curve to be used for the pairing.
Type G Curves

The final type of curves supported in [23] are Type G, which are of embedding degree 10.
Similar to Type F curves, start with q = 25x4 +25x3 +25x2 +10x+3 and t = 10x2 +5x+3.
Then find any value of D that is both squarefree and either 43 or 67 mod 120. Once that is
completed, find a solution (u, v) of u2 − 15Dv 2 = −20. u will always be equal to ±5 mod
15, meaning that x = (−5 ± u)/15. Just as in Type D curves, check that both q is prime
and that n = q − t + 1 has a large prime factor r. If it does, use the complex multiplication
method to produce this curve.
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5.2

Outside of Elliptic Curves

Lynn [22] states that RSA and integer exponentiation also fufill the conditions of a bilinear
map. This allows the mapping
e(g, a) = g a , g ∈ Zr , a ∈ Zr−1 , r ∈ Z, r > 1
to be used. However, for security reasons, the recommended sizes are still that of the normal
RSA algorithm, which are much larger than the 160-512 bits needed for elliptic curve
elements. On average, the operations required for 1024-bit RSA computations take three
times the time as that of the equivalent 160-bit EC operation [16]. This is only for standard
operations, however, and one bilinear pairing over a 521-bit elliptic curve is equivalent to
eight modular exponentiations of corresponding finite fields of the same security level.
Hyperelliptic curves are also a possibility to be used for a bilinear pairing. [22] notes
that while this is possible, no cryptographic usages are shown that produce a higher security level. While a higher embedding degree is allowed for these curves, its only a minor
increase in this value, while the complexity of the elements and pairings is much more
difficult.
A vector of integers with inner product defined also constitutes a bilinear pairing, mapping two vectors onto a value within an integer field. One example of this is shown in [25],
but there are little cryptographic implementations shown for these vectors, as each is simply a set of integer values, and would likely need to adhere to those security lenghts (such
as 1024 bits), which impose the same difficulties as using exponentiation as the pairing
function. Besides that, many of the pairings on elliptic curves could easily be translated to
integer finite field representations.

5.3

Asymmetric Pairings in CPABE

Due to the fact that only one specific supersingular curve can be implemented using the
PBC library, in order to perform a performance comparison of various curves, it must be
ensured that asymmetric bilinear pairings are possible in CPABE.
To use asymmetric pairings, two functions within CPABE need to be modified, the DecryptNode and final decryption steps, due to the fact that those functions are the locations
where the the order of the input to the pairings is needed. Note that during the key generation and encryption steps, two values are generated for each attribute, Di and Di0 for the
key, and Cx and Cx0 for the ciphertext. Asymmetric usage can be obtained by using one of
the input groups for one of each of these, and the other input group for the other two.
One proposed modification for this usage is obtained by having Di and Cx0 to be elements of G1 , and Di0 and Cx within G2 . In order to properly decrypt at each node, the order
of one of the inputs must be switched, as the original decrypt node does manipulate the
order of attributes to properly decrypt. Of course, this also assumes that the setup step is
also modified to support two input groups, with generators g1 and g2 , respectively. These
modifications can be properly applied by:
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q (0)

e(Di , Cx )
e(g1r · H(i)ri , g2z )
DecryptN ode(CT, SK, z) =
=
e(Cx0 , Di0 )
e(H(i)qz (0) , g2ri )
q (0)

q (0)

e(g1r , g2z ) · e(H(i)r(i) , g2z
=
e(H(i)qz (0) , g2ri )
= e(g1 , g2 )r·qz (0) .

)

For the interpolation during decryption, no changes are needed due to the fact that
the results are mainly multiplied from the node decryption step. When it comes to the
final decryption, however, the interpolation will provide the value e(g1 , g2 )r·s . Additional
modifications are needed during the setup and key generation steps:
1. During the setup step, set h = g1β .
2. The public key contains both input groups, G1 and G2 , both generators g1 and g2 , and
the pairing e(g1 , g2 )α .
α+r/β

3. For key generation, set D = g2

.

4. In encryption, C̃ = M · e(g1 , g2 )αs .
With all of these modifications, the final decryption can be performed as such:
C̃
e(C,D)
A

5.4

=

C̃
(α+r)/β
e(hs ,g2
)
e(g1 ,g2 )r·s

=

M · e(g1 , g2 )α·s
β·s· α+r
β
)

e(g1 ,g2
e(g1 ,g2 )r·s

=

M · e(g1 , g2 )α·s
e(g1 ,g2 )α·s ·e(g1 ,g2 )r·s
e(g1 ,g2 )r·s

=M

Supporting Work

Two known implementations of CPABE that incorporate asymmetric bilinear pairings are
the CHARM library, developed by Akinyele, Green, and Rubin [1], in addition to PIRATTE
by Jahid and Borisov [20]. In the first implementation, several pairing based cryptosystems
are demonstrated, and the version of CPABE supported in the CHARM library does allow
for asymmetric pairings to be used, by specifying that D, Dj , and Cx0 are elements of
G2 , with Dj0 and Cx as elements of G1 , the opposite of the group assignments previously
proposed. However, this framework, in addition to the published papers relating to it, does
not contain any details about the performance or justification of using ordinary curves. The
author does state that there is some overhead obtained during the encryption, but the key
generation and decryption is comparable to the C implementation. They believe that this
overhead is due to the parsing the attributes into an access policy.
On the other hand, the PIRATTE scheme is required to use asymmetric pairings due to
the fact that if the same group is used for both inputs, users can maliciously combine these
to skip the key revocation policies that the scheme was designed for, similar to collusion
attacks. More details regarding this scheme and its usage for key management is provided
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in section 6.3. They did provide a comparison of the usage of MNT curves to the type
A curves in the original CPABE implementation, and found that there was a performance
decrease in using the type D MNT curves, with the MNT curves taking 2-3 times as long
as the original implementation for encryption, decryption, and key generation.
Lynn [22] states that the size of the elements in the curve is related to whether a symmetric or asymmetric pairing is chosen. For a symmetric pairing over a supersingular curve,
security is achieved for 512 bit elements. With an asymmetric pairing, security is retained
for smaller element sizes, 160 bits for G1 and 320 bits for G2 . A tradeoff for the smaller
elements is the fact that the pairings are slower. Overall, Type F and G curves required
the smallest input size, and types A, B, D, and E produced the smallest output sizes. The
fastest pairings were for Type A and B curves. For the usage of asymmetric curves within
CPABE, a cursory glance makes type D curves appear most plausible for usage, as they
are faster than type F or G curves, with only a slight size increase. For these group sizes,
type F and G curves have the smallest input sizes, and type A,B,D, and E have the smallest
output sizes.
On the contrary, Page et al.[27] found that MNT curves had better performance for bilinear pairings in an IBE scheme than the supersingular curves. This performance increase
was roughly 50-60 % over supersingular curves of the same size. However, the cost of this
higher performance was that keys resulting from the MNT curves were three times the size
of the type A curves.
Another article, by Chen et al.[9], backed up this research by showing another modification to a pairing based scheme, this time the Direct Anonymous Attestation algorithm.
The original implementation of this modification consisted of symmetric pairings, and was
converted to an asymmetric pairing. Upon doing so, there was no additional overhead in
terms of performance when using these pairings, and the security remained the same if not
higher.

5.5

Experiment Design

For the tests performed as part of this thesis, timing analysis was performed for the various
CPABE functions, over a variety of different curves supported. In order to provide easy
usage of different curves, the CHARM framework [1] was used, which provides a quick
python prototype of CPABE that is generic and can be used with any curve supported
by the PBC library. All underlying computations are still using Lynn’s library, with the
major changes provided by this framework allowing easy generation of access trees and
serialization. The first modifications performed were to allow support for type E, F, and G
curves, which were easily added by using the same curves provided by the PBC Library.
Two main types of access trees were designed for these tests, to show the extremes of
different access trees supported. The first type of access tree is referred to as a “horizontal”
tree, which will always consist of a two level access tree. The first level of this access
tree is the root node, which is an n-input and gate, where n is the number of properties in
the access tree. The second level is all of these properties which are required in order to
decrypt the file. An example of such a tree can be seen in figure 5.1
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Figure 5.1: Horizontal Access Tree
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Figure 5.2: Vertical Access Tree

On the other hand, a “vertical” access tree consists of many more levels, with each node
having either zero or two children. The root node is a 2-input and gate, with the first child
being one property, and the second child being another 2-input and gate, in which one child
of that gate is the second property, and the other child is again another 2-input and gate.
This continues until all of the properties are within the tree, the last two properties having
the same parent node, the one non-leaf node which has two leaf nodes as children. An
easier way of visualizing this tree is provided by figure 5.2.
For both of these access tree designs, tests were run for both encryption and decryption,
using access policies of 1 to 100 attributes. The implementation was a CHARM example
implementation of the original CPABE scheme [4], which supported both symmetric and
asymmetric pairings. Using the CHARM benchmarking tools timing analysis, as well as
operation count, including a breakdown of operations in each group, was performed. There
was a single curve used for types A, D, E, F, and G, all of comparible security, 512 bit
inputs for type A, with roughly 160 bits for G1 and 320 bits for G2 in the asymmetric
pairings. Other curves supported by CHARM, such as a 1024 bit input type A curve, were
also measured, but these results are not shown here since they are larger curves and thus
their resulting operations were much more costly and any comparison would reflect as such.
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5.6

Results

All tests performed in this section were run on a modern workstation, with Fedora 18 as
the operating system, 16GB of RAM, and an AMD A10-5800K quad-core processor.
5.6.1

Operation Breakdown

With the different input groups being used for the operations, knowledge of the timing for
internal operations within the individual groups would help find dominant mathematical
operations, allowing for optimizations to be applied. Using the CHARM benchmarking
suite, the time needed for elliptic curve multiplications, divisions, and exponentiations in
the input groups was measured, as well as the same operations in the output groups and the
pairing function. Operation counts for integer groups, or addition within the elliptic curve
groups were not available, but a total operation count was provided, with the gap assumed
to be integer operations. These results are summarized in table 5.1. An N/A output is used
to denote that in the symmetric type A curve, the two input groups are the same, so the
operations are also exactly the same. All times shown in this table are in seconds.
Additionally, there was found to be an error of around 4-5% between the minimum and
maximum times for a single command, which can be attributed to the random numbers that
were used for the different operations.
From this table, a few interesting observations are obtained. The first of which is that
group multiplications are fastest in G1 for types D, F, and G curves, but G2 multiplication
is much slower by a magnitude of 10 for D and G, and only double in type F curves. This
is expected, as these curves have much smaller input groups than type A or type E curves,
and the fact that G2 is a larger group than G1 , so it would be expected that the operation
time would reflect this.
For division within these curves, the same curve types were optimal for division operations within the two input groups, with the ratio of performance between G1 and G2
being almost the same. The main difference between multiplication and division occured
when comparing the time for the operation within the output group GT . For type A, D, and
F curves, the division in GT is approximately 10 times slower than multiplication in the
same group. In pairings of type E or type G curves, the difference is much smaller, almost
negligible difference in the type E case.
Exponentiation had much of the same trends between the two input groups, except in
the case of type G curves, which were 100 times slower in G2 than the same operation
in G1 . The pairing operation found that pairings for the type A curves were fastest, and
slowest for type F curves.
5.6.2

Key Generation

As seen in figure 5.3, the fastest key generation occured for the type F curves. Following
that, type A curves were the fastest, followed by D, E, and G curves. Additionally, there
were no changes in the number of operations when using different curve groups. If optimizations were made, these counts could change. Since they are the same, the data is easily
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Curve
A
D
E
F
G
Curve
A
D
E
F
G

G1 Mult
6.290 ×10−6
2.558×10−6
1.505×10−5
2.557×10−6
2.491×10−6
G1 Exp
1.700×10−3
5.895×10−4
3.795×10−3
5.780×10−4
5.363×10−4

G2 Mult
N/A
2.360×10−5
1.513×10−5
5.358×10−6
4.747×10−5
G2 Exp
N/A
5.314×10−3
3.794×10−3
1.148×10−3
1.028×10−2

GT Mult
1.474×10−6
6.992×10−6
1.154×10−6
2.887×10−5
1.937×10−5
GT Exp
2.563×10−4
1.100×10−3
1.102×10−4
5.198×10−3
3.003×10−3

G1 Div
6.146×10−6
2.516×10−6
1.495×10−5
2.510×10−6
2.570×10−6
Pairing
1.173×10−3
3.798×10−3
4.448×10−3
2.200×10−2
1.148×10−2

G2 Div
N/A
2.360×10−5
1.521×10−6
5.299×10−6
4.759×10−5

GT Div
7.501×10−5
2.108×10−5
1.2336×10−6
1.331×10−4
4.529×10−5

Table 5.1: Time Needed for Individual Operations in Pairing Groups

comparable, and it was found that the type of operations that are used for key generation
are best in type F.
An analysis of the operation count showed that for key generation of an n attribute key
in CPABE, CHARM required n + 1 multiplications, 1 division, and 2(n + 1) exponentiations. All of the multiplications computed during this function were in G2 , while the
exponentiation was almost evenly distributed between the two input groups. The divison
occured outside of the elliptic curve groups, assumed to be in the integer field, for the computation of the exponent (α + r)/β. Because of the fact that the multiplications are found
to be in G2 here, it would be likely advantageous to all curve types to switch the groups in
which Di and Di0 are a part of, to reflect the work proposed in section 5.3 as opposed to the
input groups of the secret key elements from CHARM. This is due to the results from table
5.1, which shows that G1 multiplications are no slower than multiplications in G2 . Note
that this would also require to switch Cx and Cx0 as well, due to the pairings within decrypt
node needing to be elements of different input groups
Focusing on the three curve types which performed the best for this function, A, D, and
F, using the operation breakdown an estimation of how much time is spent during exponentiation could be calculated. For type A curves, 46% of the time spent during key generation
was for exponentiation, while type D only spent roughly 30 % of the time computing exponentiations during this same function. On the other hand, type F curves were dominated by
this exponentation, and 86% of the key generation time could be attributed to these computations. This helps suggest locations for possible modifications and optimizations in order
to minimize the times needed for this key generation.
5.6.3

Encryption

Using all of the supported curve types, the times needed to generate different length ciphertexts with a varying number of attributes was calculated for both horizontal and vertical
encryptions. The horizontal encryption results can be seen in figure 5.4, while the vertical
encryption results are shown in figure 5.5. The first point of note is that while the horizontal
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Figure 5.4: Time for Horizontal Encryption

encryption results were computed for up to 100 attributes, the vertical encryption results
only go to 81 attributes. This is due to the fact that CHARM does not support access trees
with a depth higher than 80 levels.
Similar to the key generation results, the fastest three curve types were type F, type A,
and type D, in order. Types E and G were not as high performing as these three types, with
type G taking up to 7 times as long as type A or F curves.
There were no major changes in performance between the horizontal and vertical encryption schemes. Almost all of the results were within 2-3% of the same curve for the
same number of attributes, more than the difference that could occur just from different
random numbers used as values to the multiplications and exponentations. However, what
was unusual is that these differences were consistent, hinting that there may be some very
minor differences in the underlying operations performed. For type A and D curves, the
vertical encryption took slightly longer. For type F curves, instead the horizontal encryption
took longer.
During the encryption of a message with n attributes in its access policy, it was found
that (6(n − 1)) + 1) multiplications, and 2(n + 1) exponentations were computed. Of
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these multiplications, all except one were done within the integer fields. The one exception
occured in the output group. On the other hand, the exponentations were mostly even
between the two input groups, with again a single computation done in GT . Again, using
these operation counts and the timing for individual operations, it provided an estimate of
43% of the encryption time was computing exponentations for type A, and 27% for type
D. Type F encryptions were also dominated by the exponentations, with 70% of the time
needed to compute these operations for that curve type.
For these encryptions, a single block message was encrypted under different access
trees, either horizontal or vertical. A single block consists of any random element of the
output group GT . If an actual file was to be encrypted, there would need to be some
additional translation and mapping of binary files to an element of the output group. This
would add some additional time for the encryption, but is assumed to be constant, as this
has no dependency on the length of the access policy. There could be some differences
between groups that have larger output groups, such as type F curves. Due to the fact that
this is an efficient mapping, such as a simple binary translation and padding, it would be
surprising if this makes type F curves require more time and perform worse than type A or
D curves.
5.6.4

Decryption

The most notable observation from the decryption results is that while type F curves had
the best performance for key generation and encryption, it had the worst performance for
decryption, worse than even type E or G curves. The type A pairing performed best, followed by almost identical performance for type D and E curves. However, these curve
types still took approximately three times as long as the type A curves. Type G curves did
perform better than the type F curves, but still was five to six times slower than that of the
fastest type A curves. The performance decrease for type F curves was tremendous and
took over ten times the time needed to decrypt the same file in a type A curve.
Similar to the difference between horizontal and vertical encryptions, the decryption
time for the different access trees was also very close to the other, with only minor differences between the two. However, these differences were a bit more pronouced, allowing
up to 5% of a difference in some cases, but still minor compared to the differences between
individual runs. As was the case with encryption, type A curves took longer for the vertical
access trees, while types D and F curves took longer for the horizontal encryption.
An exploration into the operations needed for decryption helps explain why type F
curves performed the worst in this function. For the decryption of a file with n attributes, the
operations consisted of 3n divisions, (5(n − 1)) + 1 multiplications, n − 1 exponentiations,
and 2n + 1 pairings. All of these operations occured in either the output group GT , or the
integer field. The fact that these operations were focused on the output groups is why type
F took so long. Due to the fact that type F curves have an embedding degree of 12, the
output group is much larger than the other curve types. In the curve used, the type F curve
has an input group size of 160 bits, meaning that the output group size is 12 · 160 = 1920
bits. On the other hand, all other curve types have an output group size of approximately
1024 bits. Due to this large difference, it would be expected that all of the operations in
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Attributes
1
5
10
25
50
75
100

Type A
1536
5632
10752
26112
51712
77312
102912

Type D
795
2703
5088
12243
24168
36093
48018

Type F
790
2686
5056
12166
24016
35866
47716

Table 5.2: Sample Key Sizes based on Number of Attributes

the output group would take much longer, and this likely explains the slow performance of
type F curves for decryption. Note that for key generation and encryption, operations in the
output group were extremely limited, so type F performed better. Additional research of
operation breakdown showed that for all of the curve types, the decryption time was 80%
spent on pairings, meaning that this would be the place to optimize. This is consistent with
the results from 5.6.1, which had type F curves taking about ten times as long to perform a
pairing operation compared to types A and D, and also had some of the slowest operations
in GT .
5.6.5

Size

Due to the fact that the CHARM library had consistent containers to hold all of the input and
output elements, no detailed information regarding the size of keys and ciphertexts could be
calculated through the performance tests. However, by using a theoretical approach based
on the design of the asymmetric scheme and using the size of the input groups for the
different curves, an estimation and comparison of the different types could be calculated.
Due to the lackluster performance of type E and G curves overall, only the size of type A,
D, and F curves were considered for this section.
The public key was the first item looked at for size. Unlike the secret keys and ciphertexts, there is no relation between attributes and the public key, so the public key would
remain constant size. Using the group assignments from CHARM explained in 5.3, the
public key had three elements of G1 , g1 , h, and f . The second generator g2 is the only part
of the public key from G2 , and there is a single element of GT , e(g1 , g2 )α . The total size of
the public key is then 3|G1 | + |G2 | + |GT |. With type A curves, this adds up to 3072 bits.
Type D curves have a total public key size of 1749 bits, while type F has a total of 2686
bits.
On the other hand, secret keys in CPABE consisted of D, an element of G2 , as well
of one element from each input group for every attribute in the key . Overall, the size of
secret keys for a user possessing n attributes would be |G2 | + n(|G1 | + |G2 |). Sample sizes
based on a number of attributes are shown in table 5.2. As seen by these numbers, type A
has very large keys, while type D and type F are roughly half the size, with type F being
narrowly smaller than type D keys.
For the ciphertexts created in CPABE, each consists of one element of GT , which is the
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Attributes
1
5
10
25
50
75
100

Type A
2560
6656
11776
27136
52736
78336
103936

Type D
1590
3498
5883
13038
24963
36888
48813

Type F
2528
4424
6794
13904
25754
37604
49454

Table 5.3: Sample Ciphertext Sizes based on Number of Attributes

encrypted message, C̃. On top of that, there is a single value C, which is an element of
G1 . Similar to the secret keys, there is one element from each input group used for every
attribute in the access policy of the ciphertext. This totals |GT |+|G1 |+n(|G1 |+|G2 |) for the
entire ciphertext. There is also additional overhead needed, such as how to store the access
policy and trees, but that is assumed to be constant and will not vary at all for the different
curve types. A sample size for ciphertexts with a varying number of leaf nodes/attributes
is shown in table 5.3. For ciphertexts with a very small number of attributes, types A and F
have comparible sizes, but type F curves do grow at a much slower rate, and are comparable
to type D curves for a large number of attributes. Type D does have the smallest ciphertexts,
again less than half that of the type A equivalents. These size differences are due to the
smaller input groups that the asymmetric curves have compared to the 512 bit type A input
groups.

5.7

Summary

Overall, it was found that the performance of type A, D, and F curves were acceptable for
the usage of CPABE, while type E and G curves were slower and unlikely to be recommended. For key generation and encryption, type F curves performed the best, but these
same curves also had the worst performance for decryption due to the larger output group
size. Based on the needs of the application, the usage of type F curves is plausible for
CPABE, as the key generation and encryption is fast, but decryption is much slower. Due
to this slow decryption, type F curves would not be recommended for many applications.
For the application of CPABE, a breakdown of the various operations showed that for
encryption and key generation, improvements could be made by focusing on the dominant
operations, which for both was exponentiations in types A and F, and multiplications of
type D. Further improvements for key generation could be achieved by switching the input groups of some of the elements, which was shown in section 5.3, but not used in the
CHARM library in which the tests were performed. For decryption, the dominant function
was pairings, and all curve types would be improved by optimizations to the pairing operation. Additionally, due to this fact that exponentiations were not the limiting factor for
type D curves in key generation and encryptions, it is plausible that an extremely efficient
multiplication operation for this curve type would provide some of the best performance.
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The size of both keys and ciphertexts were greatly minimized by the usage of type D or
F curves over that of type A curves. The smallest private keys were obtained by the usage
of a type F curve, and the smallest ciphertexts overall were from type D curves.
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Chapter 6
Key Management
The initial CPABE scheme has issues with the incorporation of key management. Because
of this, it is inherently difficult to revoke a key and prevent a user from subsequently using
this key. Additionally, this also requires some method of allowing key renewal, for either
the entire key, or individual attributes.
By default, CPABE assumes that all files encrypted will be able to be placed anywhere,
such as a non-secure server. By the properties of the scheme itself, these files are claimed
to be secure and only users with keys that satisfy the access tree are able to decrypt these
files. Unlike other cryptographic schemes, CPABE is similar to IBE in that each user has
a unique key, so issues with key sharing are not as important. But what happens when a
user is no longer a member of the organization using CPABE? By default, the user would
still have a valid key, and could subsequently decrypt and files, even ones that they are
no longer authorized to do so. This applies indefinitely, and future encrypted files are still
valid as no part of CPABE requires a user to delete or validate their keys when decrypting,
as would happen if a trusted server was used. This is why such key management strategies
are needed.
This chapter begins with a short introduction to key revocation and renewal, and then
discusses what properties are desired in CPABE in order to incorporate these features.
Then several previous works are presented, with the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Using these works as a guideline, a new set of assumptions are designed. The new work, a
key insulation scheme for CPABE, is shown, as well as a theoretical performance analysis
of this new scheme. This chapter then finishes with another brief discussion of how these
ideas can be used in order to revoke or renew individual attributes, but for the most part the
focus is on key management for full keys of users.

6.1

Definitions

6.1.1

Revocation

Key Revocation is the act of preventing any future usage of a key towards decrypting ciphertexts within an encryption scheme. For CPABE, this could either be in the form of
revoking an entire user’s key, or a specific property of a user’s key. The initial CPABE implementation [4] explains that one can use an expiration date for each property, but it still
presents the challenge of both time synchronization, and the fact that a malicious user with
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a revoked key would be able to circumvent this by manipulating the time on the system
used for decryption. In order to prevent this malicious access from occuring, one would
need to coordinate with a trusted server, which goes against the wishes of CPABE. Additionally, this would require approximately three times the number of attribute gates in the
access tree, which also increases key and ciphertext sizes, which are already quite large
when using a large number of attributes.
Other examples of Key Management are used for the public key infrastructure (PKI)
that allows many cryptographic communications over unsecured channels, such as the Internet. The standard for PKI key management is X.509 [17], which uses a hierarchy of
trusted authories to generate and present certificates to users. X.509 defines revocation as a
list of certificates which are revoked and no longer valid. An issue with this type of policy
in CPABE is the fact that users are the one who make the choice whether to listen to the
revocation list, and not servers. In X.509, a server (should) always reject revoked certificates and assume they are coming from malicious users. However, since in CPABE the
malicious user still controls their own key, and no access is required to get the ciphertext,
they are the only ones preventing themselves from being able to use their key to decrypt
the file.
6.1.2

Renewal

Renewal of keys will need to be performed when a user either has an attribute changed,
or after a certain time period, in which case the entire key will need to be renewed. In
some systems, just the renewal of a specific attribute may be performed, but this is not the
case for CPABE. In order to prevent collusion between users with different attributes, the
attributes of the same key must all be linked to not work for decryption with attributes of
another key. A possible workaround for this is the fact that the key generation keeps tracks
of the current attributes every user possesses, and generating portions of the key compatible
with the user’s current variation of their key.
A straightforward usage of CPABE would have the key renewal performed by simply running the original key generation algorithm, performed exactly the same way as in
Section 2.3, after a specified expiration period. The difficulty with this is there is much
overhead required, as it is unlikely that every user will have an attribute changed every
time period. This can also be done on demand, however, and having a user voluntarily
update their private key every time one of their attributes is updated. This is based on trust,
and in the case that the user loses an attribute they possessed, they could still keep their
old key and use it to decrypt messages that require their revoked attribute. In this case, a
method of revocation must also be presented in order to prevent the user from decrypting
messages with their previous key(s).

6.2

Desired Properties

In a CPABE scheme with key management, the desired properties must first be discussed
in order to measure the ability of the key management to meet these properties. Different
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key management ideas will only work for some kinds of server and cryptographic schemes.
Ideally, a CPABE scheme supporting key management allows
1. No requirement for trusted servers for the decryption of files. This includes proxy
servers that provide users with parts of a key to be used at decryption time. If any
communication is required during decryption, it would ideally be decentralized. Additionally, this restriction also implies that the encrypted files will be placed anywhere, and not a trusted server.
2. Minimal overhead during key revocation/renewal. This means that there should not
be a large list of different values sent to mark revoked keys, and that upon renewal
smaller values are sent rather than a brand new key. This is due to the fact that keys
are very large at times, and requiring renewal from many users may cause an issue,
especially if there is only a single key generation server.
3. Immediate revocation of a user’s key(s).

6.3
6.3.1

Supporting Work
PIRATTE

One previous implementation for key management in CPABE was provided by the PIRATTE scheme designed by Jahid and Borisov [20]. This work was important because
it allowed revocation at the cost of an additional pairing, while working with asymmetric
elliptic curve pairings. The revocation provided by this scheme was allowed by the usage
of a proxy which gives a third part of the user’s key for every attribute, or Cx00 . When the
user attempts to decrypt a file, the user is given this value by the proxy, and this allows the
decrypt node function to provide the correct value.
The proxy key in this scheme is a controlled secret sharing scheme. Upon initial setup,
the proxy key is just t random points that blind a secret value forming a t − 1 degree
polynomial , where t is the maximum number of users that can be revoked at a single
time. Each user is given a value that blinds only one of these random shares, the coefficient
P (0). The main change occurs during the key generation step, where the user’s private
key is blinded by an exponentiation by P (0). Revocation occurs by giving the proxy a
list of users which need to be revoked. Based on this, the values of the t points used for
secret sharing are modified for these revoked users, preventing them from being able to
subsequently compute the value of P (0).
The issue with the usage of this scheme is the fact that performance suffers greatly, from
both the usage of asymmetric pairings as well as the introduction of an additional pairing
needed for every leaf node in the access tree. A performance analysis done by the authors
of this paper found that in addition to the overhead of using a type D curve for CPABE,
the additional pairing required adds a much longer length for the decryption operation,
which for a larger amount of attributes was up to a 400% overhead in total decryption time.
Additionally, the extra exponentiation needed for key generation added 20-30 % more time
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for the function over the same key generation of type D pairings. Because of this, and the
need for proxy server communication, it was not further explored in this thesis.
6.3.2

Broadcast Revocation

Two different schemes supporting revocation of keys for recipients of broadcast methods
have been provided by Du et al. [11] and Zhou [35]. While the fact that they are for
broadcast messages makes it such that they don’t match the goals for complete revocation
of files, they still provide revocation techniques for an ABE scheme, and some may be
applicable to the goals of this thesis. The work of Du et al. supports revocation for KPABE
by associating users with various user groups, and encrypting files aimed towards specific
user groups using a linear secret sharing scheme. By encrypting based on these user groups,
revocation occurs by updating the groups to remove a user. When a user is removed, they
no longer belong to the new user group, and because of this, they will not match up with
the attributes needed to decrypt the key. An advantage of this scheme is that everything is
updated solely with the third parties, transparent to users. The disadvantage is that this is
a broadcast scheme which assumes there is a single central figure who sends all messages
that are being broadcast, effectively making it a one-way scheme. Another issue is that this
scheme assumes every attribute will be valid for multiple users, which may not always be
the case.
Zhou provided a similar method for broadcast revocation which supports revocation of
ABE keys while retaining minimal overhead for both storage and communications. Unlike
the work from Du above, this work does support many-to-many communications where
any user can broadcast to multiple recipients. This is provided in the scheme by having
a group controller for each group or attribute within the scheme. When a member joins
a group, they are linked a unique ID number, each bit associated with a specific secret.
By having these unique secrets and random to each group controller, collusion between
members of different groups is prohibited. By having the contoller know every unique
ID, they can combine these IDs through boolean expressions when a user is revoked, and
give updates to the remaining users. Valid users must use these secrets to in turn combine
find the group key, which is used to decrypt broadcast messages intended for that group.
Through this scheme, immediate broadcast key revocation is obtained with low complexity
communication and key storage.
6.3.3

Dynamic Revocation

One method of providing key revocation was supplied by Xu and Martin [34], which allows
the revocation of keys without requiring any modifications to ciphertexts or other keys.
Similar to PIRATTE, this scheme uses a proxy which is supplied with an additional part
of the keys, and uses this part of the key at decryption through an additional pairing. Like
other schemes, secret sharing is used to convert the user’s share with the values from the
proxy in order to get the proper value to compute the pairing. Overall, this method is not
compatible with the goals of this thesis due to the fact that it is based around storage-centric
environments, which already handle some issues with key management by having files on
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a trusted server. The keys revoked through this are revoking the access from the trusted
servers, not local keys from users.
6.3.4

User Blacklist

Maas’s thesis [24] discusses the equivalent of PKI blacklists to be used in an IBE scheme.
With this, revocation of users’ keys can be done by publicly noting the revoked keys. Due
to the fact that an IBE scheme has two keys, verification of public keys can be done for
revoked users, and revoked users will be unable to change their keys. However, while this
initially may seem promising, ABE schemes do not have multiple keys per users, and this
means there is not as much of a direct translation into a CPABE context. An additional
restriction is the fact that these revoked keys are still valid for previously sent messages,
only blocking messages that would be sent after revocation occurs. A final difficulty with
such a scheme is the fact that there is a requirement to have some infrastructure for such
communication of the blacklist and ensuring that the users receive a valid blacklist from a
trusted server.
6.3.5

Hierarchical Access Structure

One option of a key management scheme that could be adapted for CPABE is the work of
Li [21], which discusses a hierachical access structure for power systems such as utilities.
This original work was not designed for any ABE scheme, but the relationships provided
in it between keys and attributes is close to the design of KPABE. In this work, one or
more users is given a specified role. The users’ access privileges to ciphertexts or servers
are controlled by the possession of these roles. These roles additionally form a hierarchy
of various security classes that allow an inheritance relationship. The inheritance occurs
through trusted servers, using one-way functions to pass on keys granting access from the
initial role owners to other users. The usage of this in CPABE is discussed in section 6.4.1.
6.3.6

Distributed Multiple Authority CPABE

As part of Servos’s work discussing the application of CPABE to health services [30],
the possibility of using a distributed multiple authority ciphertext-policy shared attributebased encryption (DMACPSABE) scheme is presented. Through this scheme, CPABE is
adapted to use multiple key generation authorities, each granting a subset of attributes to
the users. Additionally, this work allows for NOT boolean operators to be incorporated into
access structures. In this situation, revocation is provided by these NOT operations during
encryption time. While this does work, it is not ideal as the requirement of preventing
access is to be done by the entity encrypting the file, and it adds more attributes which
in turn decreases performance of the encryption and decryption. This overhead is also
added to the keys, and some keys are incredibly large in this situation, taking up to 50MB
total. This may work in the application of health systems, but for generic usage of CPABE
based off the properties originally desired, wanting no centralized server outside of key
generation, this may prove difficult.
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6.3.7

Key-Insulated ABE

One method that allows revocation for an ABE scheme is provided by Chen et al. [8],
which provided a key-insulated approach. Unlike previous works discussed, this method
does not provide immediate revocation, but instead uses temporal keys that are valid for a
specific value. Once the period ends, if a user’s key is revoked, their key will not work for
messages encrypted in future time periods. The goal of this scheme was to minimize the
work done by the authority in renewing keys, by using a helper key to generate a single
value, and giving this value to the users. Because of the minimal overhead needed for this
renewal process, and the fact that it is not required during the actual decryption step, these
helpers which produce the renewed values can be redundant and distributed.
Key revocation in this scheme is provided by the same mechanism that allows key
renewal. If a user’s key is revoked, they will not get a renewed value for the next time
period. This value is generated by a pseudorandom function which is seeded for every
user. During each time period, the next pseudorandom value will be generated for each
user, and provided to them. The security of this method is dependent upon the inability for
a malicious user to compute the next pseudorandom value, and ensuring that all renewal
authorities have a synchronized revocation list. A detailed derivation of the functions for
KIABE is shown in section 6.4.2.
6.3.8

Attribute Revocation

Ibraimi et al. [18] provides an option for attribute revocation within a CPABE scheme.
However, this mediated CPABE scheme does not provide much functionality with regards
to revocation, as it is not immediate, requiring users to wait until a time period ends. The
revocation is performed by requiring a mediator to hold each half of the user’s key for
each attribute. These two shares are combined after decryption, with both the user and the
mediator decrypting using their shares, giving a single decrypted message. An advantage
of this scheme is that it does allow the mediators to be distributed, not requiring a single
proxy server. However, each proxy still has to contain the same shares of every user’s key,
and a single compromised server can still give a malicious user the half of every key. Due
to the fact that this only provides revocation of single attributes, and the fact that it is not
immediate, it is not a route worth pursuing for the key management wanted for this thesis.
Another scheme providing attribute revocation is provided by Qiuxin and Miao [28]. In
this scheme, linear secret sharing matrices are used as a means of creating semi-functional
keys and ciphertexts. One tradeoff of using such matrices are that it requires a small universe scheme, in which all attributes used must be known during the setup step, and if additional attributes need to be subsequently added, all keys are no longer valid. The revocation
works by simply managing a list of attributes which need to be revoked. If an attribute is
revoked, then during decryption, ciphertexts requiring any of the revoked attributes are ignored, and the threshold for the associated access tree, and allowing decryption without
that. However, this revocation is unrelated to the goals aimed for earlier in this chapter, and
this makes it difficult for full key revocation, as there is no restriction that prevents any user
key from being used still.
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6.4
6.4.1

Proposed Changes
Hierarchical Access Structure

A possible translation of the hierarchical access structure, presented in Li’s work [21], to
CPABE would be to allow different users to form a hierarchy for various attributes, and
using these as ways to verify or guarantee user possession of an attribute, while handling
key revocation for that specific attribute. By using this, any attacks or collusion would
only provide a single attribute, and collision would still be difficult due to the hierarchy
and different ”gatekeepers” of the attributes, preventing the malicious user from knowing
which user possesses the role they are trying to collude. Each gatekeeper would be in
charge of communicating with the servers that provide revocation, and allow a method
to verify a user’s identity, and then giving them a token that can be used for decryption.
While this method does require that a user communicates with multiple entities during
decryption, these are decentralized and unpredictable, reducing the risk of having a single
central authority being compromised. The hierarchy is retained by having the delegation
function used to produce these values. The difference is this delegation is orchestrated by
the central authority, and not initiated by the user producing the delegate key. This scheme
works by splitting one of the values for each atrribute in the key, Dj and Dj0 , and one of
these is the value that is given to the user upon validation to the gatekeeper.
While this looks promising, there are issues with both communication with other general users in the system, as well as collusion resistance. The first issue is regarding anonymity
and the fact that the gatekeepers would know various users who posses the same attributes.
In some applications, this is a security issue itself. A workaround for this would be to have
generic anonymous references to the users communicating, but would still be possbile to
track the communications. The other main issue is the collusion resistance and how that
impacts the storage required for these values. Because of the possibility of collusion, the
values users are given from the gatekeepers must be unique for each user. If not, users could
collude to reuse the values between them. However, these values must also be unique in
order to allow revocation, as the same value could be kept by the users and reused after their
key is no longer supposed to be valid. This in turn requires that there would be a unique
value given for each user and each ciphertext, which gives the gatekeeper a large amount of
information such as the number of ciphertexts requiring each attribute, and requires a large
storage space for each of these values, one for each user/ciphertext pair.
Another possible solution involves using temporal keys, simular to the key insulation
approach. This method uses a series of temporal key values, one given to the gatekeeper of
each attribute. Upon decryption, the shares given from each are combined to get a specific
value, which is also used for decryption. This does not work, however, for OR gates in the
access tree, as secret sharing is designed for AND or threshold gates. Additionally, this
method is much more inefficient to the proposal from section 6.4.2, due to the communication overhead.
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6.4.2

Key Insulated CPABE

KIABE

Originally provided by Chen et al.,̇ the original Key-Insulated ABE (KIABE) scheme defines the following methods as part of the scheme.
This function generates the parameters needed for the rest of the functions. In
addition to the selection of the initial pairing group, a pseudorandom function Fω (x) must
be defined. This function’s seeds will be unique to each user, with x representing the
current time period in which an output is requested. ω is used within the rest of this scheme
to represent a user’s identity and attribute set as a single variable.
Setup

g = Generator of G1
y ∈ Zp
g2 , h1 , v1 , ...vn+1 ∈ G1
g1 = g y
V (x) = g2xn g h(x)
Hw (x) = g1x h1
P K = (g1 , g2 , h1 , v1 , ...vn )
MK = y
Key generation is defined by the following equations. After this function
is completed, the value HK is given to the helper, and T K is given to the user.

Key Generation

HKω = {0, 1}κ
kω,0 = FHKω (0)
q(x) = d − 1 degree polynomial such that q(0) = y
q(i)

T Kω,0 = (g kω,0 , ∀i ∈ ω : {g2 V (i)ri Hω (0)kω,0 , g ri })
κ is the length of the seed required by the pseudorandom function, so the initial HK
value is set to a κ bit string unique to the the user. One possibility for creating this would
to be a hashed value of the user’s idenity.
At the expiration of the time period t − 1, the helper needs to generate a
new value U I which is valid for the next time period t for each user. These values are only
generated and given to the user if their keys are still valid. Revoked users will not get an
updated U I value for time period t, and subsequently their keys will no longer provide the

Helper Update
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ability to decrypt messages.
kω,t = FHKω (t), kω,t−1 = FHKω (t − 1)
U Iω,t−1,t = (Hω (t)kω,t /Hω (t − 1)kω,t−1 , g kω,t )
User Update Once given the updated value U I for the time period t, the user can update
their temporary key T K to be valid for this same time period. Note that the values used
for the attribute objects will cancel out, leaving the key in a format similar to that created
during key generation, but valid for time period t instead of time period 0.

T Kω,t = (g kω,t , ∀i ∈ ω :
q(i)

{g2 V (i)ri Hω (t − 1)kω,t−1 · Hω (t)kω,t /Hω (t − 1)kω,t−1 , g ri })

Encryption Encryption is performed on a message M valid for time period t with attribute
set ω 0 as such. Note that ω 0 is defined that the message can be decrypted if and only if the
user with attribute set ω posseses at least d of the same attributes required by ω 0 .

s ∈ Zp
E = (t, ω , E = M · e(g1 , g2 ) , E = g s , E 000 = Hω (t)s , ∀i ∈ ω 0 : Ei = V (i)s )
0

0

s

00

Decryption of the ciphertext E by the user with attribute set / identity ω is
done as such.
Decryption

S = ω ∩ ω 0 such that |ω ∩ ω 0 | ≥ d
!
Y
e(g ri , Ei )e(g kω,t , E 000 )
0
M =E
q(i)
e(g2 V (i)ri Hω (t)kω,t , E 00 )
i∈S
= M · e(g1 , g2 )s
= M · e(g1 , g2 )s

Y

Y

e(g ri , V (i)s )e(g kω,t , Hω (t)s )

i∈S

e(g2 V (i)ri Hω (t)kω,t , g s )

!

q(i)

e(g ri , V (i)s )e(g kω,t , Hω (t)s )
q(i)

e(g2 , g s )e(V (i)ri , g s )e(Hω (t)kω,t , g s )

Y
1
s
= M · e(g1 , g2 )
e(g, g2 )q(i)s
i∈S
i∈S

=M

e(g1 , g2 )s
e(g y , g2 )s
=
M
=M
e(g, g2 )ys
e(g, g2 )ys

!
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KICPABE

A KICPABE scheme is now presented. The KIABE scheme was modified in order to use
the temporal keys in both the decrypt node and final encryption functions, with no change
needed during the interpolation at non-leaf nodes. Note that in CPABE, each user has a
random value r that is used to blind the values until these interpolation functions. This is
where the temporal keys for KIABE are used, and the r value is replaced by the kω value.
Similar to CPABE and KIABE, the following functions are defined as part of this
scheme. These definitions are based upon a symmetric CPABE scheme, but using the
modifications from chapter 5 asymmetric pairing groups can also be used.
Setup The setup in this case is exactly the same as the original CPABE scheme. The only
difference is that the pseudorandom functions as well as the one-way functions needed for
the keys and ciphertext values must be defined as well.

P K = G0 , g, h = g β , f = g 1/β , e(g, g)α
M K = (β, g α )
As mentioned, Fseed is a pseudorandom function, the same that was used
in the original KIABE scheme, with the seed being a unique κ bit representation of the
user. H is the same hash function from CPABE that maps attribute names to elements of
G1 . The function T is also a one-way hashing function, and may be either the same or a
different function, mapping instead integers representing the time period to elements of G1 .
Key Generation

HKω = {0, 1}κ
kω,0 = FHKω (0)
T K0 = (D = g (α+kω,0 )/β ,
∀j ∈ S : Dj = g kω,0 · H(i)ri · T (0), Dj0 = g rj )
Just as in the KIABE scheme, the goal of this function is to have the helper
generate a value which will be given to user ω to update their key from time period t − 1 to
time period t.
Helper Update

U Iω,t−1,t = (g kω,t , g (α+kω,t )/β , T (t)/T (t − 1))
One point of note is the contrast between this update function and that of the KIABE
scheme. In the KIABE, the update function exponentiates by the kω,t value for each time
period. This is not done here due to how the decryption is setup. The reasoning behind this
is explained in the summary of that function. One point is that this may allow malicious
users to discover the values output from T , but that is not an issue due to the fact that these
are only part of the mask used for the time period, and the ri value is still needed to produce
an advantage.
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An additional difference is the fact that there is a third value given to the user opposed
to the KIABE version. This is due to the fact that with the replacement of the value r with
thw k value makes it such that the user’s key requires both to properly update - the first for
the Dj value, the second for the D value. Given only one of the k value or g k , users are not
able to properly update their D value for the new time period, as β is a hidden value part
of the secret key.
There are no changes to the purpose or design of this function compared to
the KIABE version.

User Update

T Kt = (D = g (α+kω,t )/β ,
∀j ∈ S : Dj = g kω,t · H(j)rj · T (t − 1) · T (t)/T (t − 1), Dj0 = g rj )
Again there are no functional changes to the usage of this outside of the adaptation from the KIABE version.
Encryption

s ∈ Zp
qR (0) = s
CT = (t, τ, C̃ = M · e(g, g)αs , C = hs ,
∀ y ∈ Y : Cy = g qy (0) , Cy0 = H(y)qy (0) · T (t))
The first step is the decrypt node function. Since the r value per user was
replaced with k, that is desired in the output from this function. This is also where the
H or T function outputs in the helper update can not be exponentiated by k, due to the
fact that the setup of decrypt node requires that these values cancel out, which would leave
another value exponentiated by k. In order to cancel out properly, the Di0 value would be
also needed to be exponentiated, which in turn would add many more values to the update
function. Exponentiation in the Cz values can not occur as these are unique to the ciphertext
while the k values are unique to the user.
Decryption

e(Di , Cz )
e(g kω,t · H(i)ri · T (t), g qz (0) )
=
e(Di0 , Cz0 )
e(g ri , H(i)qz (0) · T (t))
e(g kω,t , g qz (0) ) · e(H(i)ri · T (t), g qz (0) )
=
e(g ri , H(i)qz (0) · T (t))
= e(g, g)qz (0)·kω,t

DecryptN ode(CT, SK, z) =

For interpolation during the decryption, the same as CPABE is performed here, but
instead producing the value A = e(g, g)kω,t ·qR (0) = e(g, g)kω,t ·s due to the usage of k
instead of r.
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Given this value A from the interpolation of the root node, the final decryption occurs
as follows.
C̃
e(C,D)
A

6.5
6.5.1

=

C̃
e(hs ,g (α+kω,t )/β )
e(g,g)s·kω,t

=

M · e(g, g)αs
β·s·

α+kω,t

β
e(g,g)
e(g,g)s·kω,t

=

M · e(g, g)αs
e(g,g)α·s ·e(g,g)s·kω,t
e(g,g)s·kω,t

=M

Performance
Speed

The design of the key insulation function was made as such to minimize any extra pairings
and exponentiations during decryption time. Because of the fact that keys are updated
externally to the decryption, there are no additional operations required for decryption over
that of the original CPABE scheme. It would be expected that the time required for this
decryption would match that obtained from the previous chapter for decryptions of the
same group used.
For encryption and key generation, there are a couple extra multiplications that must
be done in order to account for the T values. The operation breakdown from the previous
chapter showed that the group multiplication is on the order of 10−6 seconds, which also
was equivalent to an additional attribute in key generation, and less due to the number
of multiplications already used for encryption. On top of this, there are the one-way and
pseudorandom functions that need to be computed, but these are again expected to take
much less time than the other operations needed.
During the helper and user update functions, one must look into the time required for
them. The helper update takes two exponentiations in an input group, as well as two integer divisions. The exponentiations are a limiting factor here, espeically when taking into
account that this function must be computed for every user at the end of every time period.
Adjusting the time period to longer values would reduce this load, but at the cost of security
as invalid keys would take longer to be revoked. One note is that the key insulation does
allow these helpers to be distributed to minimize the work each helper has to do. Additionally, there is no work for the helper to be doing in between the expiration of these time
periods, meaning it could precompute the values as needed, and only distribute them at the
beginning of the new time period. Upon receipt of the update, the user needs to perform n
G1 multiplications, one for every Dj value, where n is the number of attributes in the user’s
key.
6.5.2

Size

Again, because of the design of the scheme, there are no modifications to the size of keys
or ciphertexts produced by KICPABE. This is because every multiplication of values from
T still reduces to elements within the same input group as previous.
For the update value sent, this consists only of 3 elements of G1 . This is again on a per
user basis, and is smaller here if nonsymmetric pairings are chosen. This is as most 1536
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bits needed, assuming that a type A curve is used here. This should not create much of a
network bottleneck unless hundreds of thousands of users are in the scheme.
The size restriction comes into play when one looks at how users handle decrypting
files from multiple time periods. One assumption here can be made that users will toss out
all keys once that time period expires. This then means that users are unable to decrypt
previous files, as they were encrypted during previous time periods. The other option here
is to require that users keep all previous keys, at which point multiple time periods would
require a large burden of storage for every user.
6.5.3

Disadvantages

As mentioned above, there is an issue when determining how to handle storage of keys
for multiple time periods. Either the users can keep previous keys, which require a large
storage overhead, or they are tossed, preventing the users from decrypting any ciphertexts
from previous time periods.
One work around for the storage would be the assumption that users will automatically
decrypt any file they can as soon as it is encrypted. This would reduce the storage needed,
but at the same time also require that users instead store plaintext files, which may cause
an issue because if they are compromised then the attackers would get access to each of
the plaintexts as well. User compromise is not covered here because it would be assumed
that the attacker could also get the keys and subsequently decrypt the files. This could be
avoided by using some guarantee that there is a two-factor authentication needed to access
the keys to decrypt, but this same issue is plausible with even the original CPABE scheme.
On the other hand, even if a user keeps all previous keys, there needs to be some method
of handling users who enter the system after the initial setup. By the design of this, either
their initial key becomes huge, as they need to get all previous keys as well, or they are
only starting with a key valid for the current time period, preventing them from accessing
previously encrypted files.
One option is to require that after a specified number of time periods, the user tosses
out all keys except the n most recent, and all ciphertexts encrypted before the last n time
periods are reencrypted. This adds additional issues, such as how to handle files that no
users are able to decrypt, or dealing with the large amount of files that all much be encrypted
again at once.
This issue is nonexistent depending on the application. For example, if there was to
be a broadcast application, which the recipients either immediately decrypt, or ignore and
don’t care for ever decrypting, there is no need to store previous key values.
6.5.4

Security

For security of the key insulated CPABE scheme, it is important to look at the values that
must be determined for a malicious user to use a revoked key. The main difference between
CPABE and KICPABE is the modification of the k value in place of the r value, and that is
important to look at for security.
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Assume that a user does not have a valid k value for the time period t + 1, but they do
for time period t. This would imply that a user’s key has been revoked and not renewed for
the next time period. Because of the fact that the k values are generated by a pseudorandom
function, the security of the k values are related to the security of this function as well as
the seed. If a malicious user is able to determine the seed, they are then subsequently able
to derive any k values and generate keys for any time period. Therefore the security of the
entire scheme is defined by the inability of the users to compute seeds or determine the
pseudorandom function. This is external to the CPABE scheme, and is a future avenue of
exploration.
The setup of the T function and the fact that the outputs are not exponentiated means
that it may be possible for a user to discern T (t) and T (t − 1). If the hash function is
known, then the user can subsequently generate T (t + 1) and so on. This may not be a flaw,
as if files are to be reencrypted after a certain number of time periods, this allows users to
perform this encryption prior to the actual time period. This is fine because no users will
have keys valid for the future time periods, and would be unable to decrypt them until they
access their key from that period. Additionally, if a user is given only the T values, they are
unable to generate new keys or any advantage due to the fact that even with malicious T
values, they do not have the ri values needed to be used in the decrypt node function. Even
if their values are modified, it is still difficult to discern the other part of their key, the H
value for each attribute. These values are only used to cancel out based on the attribute, and
even if the user is able to forge having a valid key for the time period for that decrypt node,
their result will still have the incorrect k value during interpolation and final decryption.
However, it is recommended that the T values are made public, because the advantages
outweigh the possible security flaws for this value, with it being required on the k value
still. The other option is to simply just only give the current T value for the time period, as
that is still needed by the users in order to properly encrypt based on that time period.

6.6

Summary

Several options for key management are possible based on the desired restrictions of the
scheme and the application in which it is being used. Due to the fact that CPABE desires
to not use trusted servers, key management is difficult, especially for immediate key revocation. Previous works have shown that this tradeoff is difficult, and many schemes make
immediate revocation difficult without trusted servers.
A key insulated approach to CPABE was presented, designed by substituting the r value
in the CPABE user keys and replacing with a pseudorandom value k, as done in the key
insulated ABE scheme [8]. With this, keys are valid for specific time periods, and renewal
and revocation is done by small updates to keys from helpers. Outside of this modification,
there are no additional operations required in order to decrypt files compared to the original CPABE scheme. The security of this scheme is directly related to the pseudorandom
function used to generate values used as exponents for the helper keys.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Directions
Two avenues related to the performance of Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
were explored as part of this thesis. The first was looking into the different types of elliptic
curve pairings supported by the Pairing Based Cryptography library [23], and performing
a size and performance analysis of these types through CHARM, a python cryptography
prototyping framework [1]. It was found that type F, or Barreto-Naehrig, curves, had the
fastest key generation and decryption, but the slowest decryption of all curve types. It was
found that this slow decryption is due to the fact that the output group is almost twice the
size of other groups, and operations take much longer in this group.
The second half of new work was with regards to key management for a CPABE
scheme. While looking at immediate revocation proved difficult for a CPABE scheme,
the usage of key insulation allowed both revocation during specific time periods, as well as
providing an efficient mechanism for key renewal.

7.1

Future Work

Other elliptic curve libraries may end up producing different results outside of the PBC
library which was the focus of this work. An additional option is the MIRACL library [26],
which is additionally supported by CHARM, and may have different underlying operations
which change the results obtained from this thesis.
For group selection, a key direction would be into the underlying operations required for
the asymmetric curve types. As is, due to the fact that decryption, the most vital function,
takes the longest for the type F curves, it makes them not recommended for many applications. Any optimizations which improve decryption on type F curves would be promising
to see. Additionally, due to the high embedding degree of these curves, some attacks on
other curves of lower embedding degrees may require that these curves are used, and the
optimizations will be needed for comparable performance.
The key management scheme provided as part of this thesis works best when used in
a broadcast application. In the works covered in this thesis, some provided efficient key
revocation for broadcast applications of attribute based encryption schemes. A comparison in both efficiency, key size, and security of KICPABE to these schemes would allow
different views of which is most efficient of these schemes.
For security of the KICPABE scheme, analysis of different pseudorandom and oneway functions would be a place to start. Additionally, critics of CPABE have noted that
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the initial scheme [4] is only secure under a weak generic group model. Waters does improve this in his work [19] in order to prove the security under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
model. Therefore, with the modifications proposed from KICPABE, it would be promising
to modify it under this scheme and prove its security under this model.
Finally, more research into various key management methods would prove useful, allowing various different choices that may not have been covered in the scope of this thesis.
Ideally, immediate key revocation would be allowed with no requirement on trusted servers
at all.
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